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Abstract
Early in 1978 the Carter Administration implemented a trigger price mechanism (TPM) to aid
the distressed United States steel industry. Although the TPM by its terms is a monitoring system,
the controversy it has aroused suggests that its actual function extends far beyond mere monitoring
of steel imports. Part I of this Comment will examine the TPM in the context of world steel trade
to show how the original system actually functioned, and how the new version is likely to operate.
Part II will explore the ways in which this import relief program is inconsistent with traditional
United States trade law and policy.
COMMENT
THE REINSTATED STEEL TRIGGER PRICE
MECHANISM: REINFORCED BARRIER
TO IMPORT COMPETITION*
INTRODUCTION
Early in 1978 the Carter Administration implemented a trigger
price mechanism (TPM)1 to aid the distressed United States steel
industry. Part of a comprehensive program for the industry, 2 the
TPM was intended to "expedite relief from unfair import competi-
tion, but to do so in a manner which [would] not preclude healthy
competition in the [United States] market."-3
The TPM regulations were proposed as a monitoring system4
to be used by the Department of the Treasury to facilitate enforce-
ment of the Antidumping Act of 1921. 5 The Antidumping Act was
* The author is currently employed by a steel importing concern in New York City.
1. The TPM was recommended to President Carter by an Interagency Task
Force headed by Under Secretary of the Treasury Anthony M. Solomon. Report to
the President: A Comprehensive Program for the Steel Industry, released Dec. 6,
1977 [hereinafter cited as Solomon Report], reprinted in Hearings on the Adminis-
tration's Comprehensive Program for the Steel Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-38 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Steel Industry Hearings]'. The President approved the plan on
the date of its release. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1835 (Dec. 6, 1977). The
Treasury Department first publicized its intention to implement the TPM along with
an announcement of proposed rulemaking governing collection of information
through a Special Summary Steel Invoice (SSSI) to be filed at the time of importa-
tion of steel articles. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1977). Final regulations on the SSSI were
published February 13, 1978, and became effective February 21, 1978 as an amend-
ment to customs entry regulations under 19 C.F.R. 141.89 (1980). 43 Fed. Reg. 6065
(1978). The first trigger prices for seventeen steel mill products were announced by
the Treasury Department on January 3, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
2. In addition to implementation of the TPM, the Interagency Task Force rec-
ommended tax incentives to modernize United States steel facilities, loan guarantees
for domestic steel mills, "rationalization" of environmental policies and procedures,
community and labor assistance, and other general measures. Solomon Report, supra
note 1, at 21-35.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 13-14.
5. Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (repealed 1979). The Antidumping Act was criticized as
procedurally too cumbersome and too product-specific to provide effective relief
from surges of imports of a broad range of steel products. Solomon Report, supra
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subsequently repealed by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,6 but
the TPM remained in effect under the antidumping provisions
of the new act. 7 On January 2, 1980, authority to administer the
TPM was transferred to the Commerce Department by Executive
Order. 8
In all, the system operated for 25 months before the Com-
merce Department suspended it on March 21, 1980, in reaction to
the filing of large-scale antidumping complaints by U.S. Steel Cor-
poration. 9 The mixed results of the TPM during that period sub-
jected the system to widespread criticism. 0
Prolonged negotiations between the government and U.S.
Steel resulted in withdrawal of the antidumping complaints and
reinstatement of the TPM, in a revised form approved by the in-
note 1, at 12-13. The TPM, designed to streamline enforcement procedures,
consisted of four basic components: (1) establishment of trigger prices for steel in-
dustry, and the cost of production and prices of steel mill products imported into the
United States; (2) adoption of the SSSI; (3) continuous collection and analysis of data
concerning both conditions in the domestic steel industry, and the cost of production
and prices of steel mill products in the countries that are the principal exporters of
such products to the United States; and (4) where deemed appropriate, expedited
initiation and disposition of proceedings under the Antidumping Act of 1921 with
respect to imports priced below trigger prices. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,125 (1977);
see notes 109-19 infra and accompanying text.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
7. Id. § 101, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (Supp. III 1979). These sections replace
the Antidumping Act of 1921 by adding a new Title VII, Countervailing and
Antidumping Duties, to the Tariff Act of 1930. Id.
8. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). See also Reorg. Plan No. 3
of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
9. U.S. Steel Corporation filed major antidumping petitions with Commerce
against steel imports from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany. 45 Fed. Reg. 26,109 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg.
20,150 (1980). Commerce noted that the TPM was intended as a substitute for major
antidumping complaints by private parties, and concluded that continuing the TPM
while investigating industry complaints would undercut the basis upon which the
TPM was established. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150 (1980).
10. Criticism of the TPM came from steel importers, domestic steelmakers, pro-
tectionists, and free trade advocates alike. See, e.g., Trigger Prices are Set, But Who's
Under the Gun?, IRON AGE, Jan. 16, 1978, at 28; Plug Trigger-Price "Loopholes:"
SSCI, Am. Metal Mkt., Aug. 12, 1980, at 4, col. 1; The TPM: Inflation's Ally?, id.
Apr. 2, 1980, at 21, col. 1; Steel Fence, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 20, col. 1; Na-
tional Steel Official Blames Shipping Lag on Trigger Flaws, Am. Metal Mkt., Apr. 3,
1979, at 4, col. 1; Steel Trigger Price Hearings Delineate Two Opposing Camps, id.,
Feb. 1, 1978, at 18, col. 1; Few Happy With Steel Price Plan, J. of Com., Jan. 26,
1978, at 1, col. 2. In its press release announcing the filing of its antidumping com-
plaints against seven European steel-exporting countries, see note 9 supra, U.S. Steel
Corp. cited "a host of inadequacies, distortions, and failures of the TPM." United
States Steel Public Affairs Release (Mar. 20, 1980).
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dustry, on October 9, 1980.11 Nevertheless, controversy continues
to surround the system. 12
Although the TPM by its terms is a monitoring system, 13 the
controversy it has aroused suggests that its actual function extends
far beyond mere monitoring of steel imports. Part I of this Com-
ment will examine the TPM in the context of world steel trade to
show how the original system actually functioned, and how the
new version is likely to operate. Part II will explore the ways in
which this import relief program is inconsistent with traditional
United States trade law and policy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TPM
A. The United States and World Steel Trade
The position of the United States in world steel production has
steadily declined since the 1950's.14 International steel trade has
played a major role in that decline. 15 Exports have been a vital fac-
tor in the growth of production in Japan, the European Economic
Community (EEC), and a number of advanced developing na-
tions. 16 Yet from 1956 to 1976, while annual world steel exports
grew more than three-fold, United States exports actually de-
ll. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Orban Criticizes Anti-Surge Provision in New Triggers, Labels It
a Form of Quota, Am. Metal Mkt., Dec. 9, 1980, at 1, col. 3; Nucor's Iverson Sees
Triggers Doing More Damage Than Good, id. Dec. 2, 1980, at 4, col. 2; Protection-
ism Seen Limiting Exports, Job Growth, id. Oct. 27, 1980, at 28, col. 1; Overseas
Lukewarm to Triggers: Anti-Surge, Preclearance Sections Draw Fire of Europe and
Japan, id. Oct. 3, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Revived Trigger System Prompts Pleas for
Changes, id. Oct. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
13. See note 4 supra; Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 292
(D.D.C. 1978).
14. United States International Trade Commission, Pub. No. 951, Conditions of
Competition in the Western U.S. Steel Market Between Certain Domestic and For-
eign Steel Products, app. B-2 (1979), [hereinafter cited as USITC Pub. 951]. The
United States was the world's largest steel producer in 1956, with a 36.8% share of
total world production. Id. at app. B-3. In 1976, its 17.0% share ranked it second, be-
hind the Soviet Union and barely ahead of Japan. Id. at app. B-2.
15. See generally H. Pifer, P. Marshall, & J. Merrill, Economics of International
Steel Trade: Policy Implications for the United States (May 1977) (report prepared
for the American Iron and Steel Institute by Putnam, Hayes, & Bartlett, Inc.) [here-
inafter cited as Putnam, Hayes Report].
16. Exports accounted for more than 65% of total Japanese growth in produc-
tion in the decade 1967-1976. Id. at 4. During the same period, EEC reliance on ex-
ports to sustain growth in production increased from 10% to 35%. Id.
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clined. 17 Once the world's leading exporter of steel, the United
States has become its largest importer; 18 as much as 18 percent
of annual apparent consumption has been supplied by foreign pro-
ducers. 19
The declining United States position in international steel
trade has been accompanied by a deterioration in the financial
health of the domestic industry.20 Profits have fallen over the last
three decades. 21 A number of reasons have been offered to explain
this trend. 22 The single factor which domestic steel producers have
stressed most often in recent years has been the quantity of low-
priced imports suppressing prices and limiting sales volume, and
thus inhibiting the capital formation necessary to expand and mod-
ernize United States production facilities.23 In particular, United
States steel producers complain that foreign steel is being
"dumped" in their market, injuring the domestic steel industry.24
17. H. Mueller & K. Kawahito, Steel Industry Economics: A Comparative
Analysis of Structure, Conduct and Performance 3 (Jan. 1978) (report prepared for Ja-
pan Steel Information Center) [hereinafter cited as Mueller and Kawahito]. From
1956 to 1976, annual world steel exports increased by 334%, from 30.4 million tons
to 131.6 million tons. All major steel producers other than the United States recorded
at least a 47% increase. Id. at 3-4.
18. Draft Preliminary Report of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee Work-
ing Group on International Trade, July 21, 1980, reprinted in U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
(BNA), No. 37, July 23, 1980, at M-1 [hereinafter cited as Tripartite Committee Re-
port].
19. Id. Since 1959, when the United States became a net importer of steel,
imports have filled more than 35% of the growth in U.S. apparent steel consumption.
Putnam, Hayes Report, supra note 15, at 4.
20. Tripartite Committee Report, supra note 18, at M-1.
21. Id.
22. Contributing factors include high labor costs, climbing construction costs
and interest rates for new plants, pollution control requirements, rising raw material
costs and fuel expenses, and government intervention restraining prices. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, A STUDY OF STEEL PRICES xi (1975)
(hereinafter cited as 1975 COWPS Report]; American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel
at the Crossroads: The American Steel Industry in the 1980's, at 7-15 (Jan. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Steel at the Crossroads]; Mueller & Kawahito, supra note 17, at
2, 18, 24-26; Putnam, Hayes Report, supra note 15, at 28-33; The Detroit News, Dec.
1, 1977, at D7, col. 1.
23. See American Iron and Steel Institute, The Steel Industry Today: A Report
to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy 10-11 (May 1971); Steel at the Cross-
roads, supra note 22, at 12-13; American Iron and Steel Institute, The Steel Import
Problem 35-36 (3rd ed.) (July 1968).
24. Between January 1, 1934, and December 31, 1956, 198 antidumping inves-
tigations were undertaken, counting all industries together. REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF THE TREASURY TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECTIVE-
TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM
B. Dumping
The term "dumping" refers to the practice of selling goods for
export at prices lower than prices charged for the same or similar
goods at the same time, and under like circumstances, in the home
market.2 5 A manufacturer or government in an exporting country
may enjoy a number of benefits by selling goods abroad at prices
below home market prices. Where, as in the steel industry, fixed
costs incurred irrespective of level of production, such as plant and
equipment costs, are relatively high, and variable costs proportion-
ate to output, such as raw material costs, are relatively low, dump-
ing may permit a manufacturer to maintain a high production level
and to minimize average cost of goods, thus maximizing overall
profit. 26 Dumping may aid the development of an infant industry
in a nation where demand in the home market is inelastic, 27 may
protect a national industry from high unemployment levels in an
economic down-cycle, 28 or may be used as a means of increasing
foreign currency exchange. 2 9
Dumping may be beneficial to the importing country as well.
It may provide consumers with sporadic, short-lived bargains,
without causing permanent harm to competing domestic manufac-
turers. 30 Even a permanent supply of bargain-priced goods may act
as a stimulus to competition and improved efficiency, and as a
counter-inflationary force. 31
NESS OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT AND ON AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT CONSIDERED
DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY 15-16 (1957) (mimeographed ed.). Between January 1, 1975,
and December 6, 1977, 19 separate antidumping complaints were submitted by the
steel industry alone, and indications were that more were on the way. Solomon Re-
port, supra note 1, at 4.
25. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 46 (1958). A
broader definition is "price discrimination between national markets." Id.
26. See Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States
and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 503 (1958);
Putnam, Hayes report, supra note 15, at 43-55.
27. Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 47.
28. Id.
29. Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antidumping Act and the
Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REV. 409, 448 (1965).
30. Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 47-48.
31. Id. See also Baier, supra note 29, at 449. This is the view taken by free
trade advocates, based on the theory that dumping is consistent with the principle of
long-run comparative economic advantage. See J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 28-31, 138 (1923).
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Yet dumping is more often perceived as being harmful to the
importing country. 32 At its worst, price discrimination in interna-
tional trade may be a weapon of economic warfare. 33 An exporter
may sell goods cheaply in a foreign market with the intent to drive
out competition or to prevent the establishment of a rival indus-
try. 34 After competition has been eliminated, the exporter may
raise prices to the detriment of the same consumers who had
temporarily benefited from bargain prices. 35 Because of its poten-
tial for harm, dumping has been the target of protective trade laws
in the United States for most of this century. 36
32. "Dumping" is implicitly defined by the United States Antidumping Law to
include an injury component. Although the statutory language, "sales at less than fair
value," follows the economic definition of dumping, an antidumping duty order is
not issued unless there is a determination of actual or potential material injury to a
United States industry, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic in-
dustry. See notes 43-67 infra and accompanying text.
33. Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 47.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Dumping is as old as the mercantile system. In 1791 Alexander Hamilton
called attention to dumping of sail cloth and linens into the United States by British
exporters. See S. Doc. No. 112, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). Dumping began to take
on major significance toward the end of the 19th century, when giant industrial car-
tels in Germany and the United States producing steel and machinery engaged in ex-
tensive dumping. J. VINER, supra note 31, at 51, 80. The first United States statute
directed against dumping was the Antidumping Act of 1916. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
That act was intended to curtail intentional intermittent predatory dumping, making
it a criminal offense for persons to import goods "at a price substantially less than
the actual market value . . . Provided, That such act . . . be done with the intent of
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States .... " Id. The active enforce-
ment of that act was prevented by the difficulty in proving the intent required by the
statute. Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 45, 58. After World War I, to provide an enforce-
able statute and to protect United States "war baby" industries from dumped
imports, Congress enacted the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (repealed
1979). Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 45, 53.
More modern attempts at regulation have been international in scope. Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral effort at in-
ternational trade regulation which seeks to control the predatory aspects of dumping
and government subsidization of exports while softening the harsh, trade-stifling ap-
proach to antidumping and countervailing duty legislation taken by some nations.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61
Stat. A3, A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The
United States Trade Agreements Act of 1979 enacted antidumping and counter-
vailing provisions intended to comport with article VI of GATT and to implement
two important agreements negotiated in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations under
GATT: the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
9619 (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures); and the Agreement on Im-
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C. The United States Antidumping Law
Despite the declared United States policy of expanding inter-
national trade by reducing artificial barriers to trade among na-
tions, 37 protection from imports is available to United States indus-
tries under several trade law provisions. 38 The great majority of
import relief petitions by domestic steel producers in recent years,
however, have alleged injurious sales, at less than fair value 39 under
plementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 [hereinafter cited as International Antidumping Code]. S.
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 381, 423. For an excellent history of antidumping and countervailing duty
laws, see generally Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 44-45, 50-54. For a more recent view
of multilateral trade regulation, especially article VI of GATT and the International
Antidumping Code, see generally Barcelo, supra note 26.
37. The United States is dedicated, at least in principle, to a liberal, expansive
trade policy encouraging increased exchange of goods with other free nations. One of
the declared purposes of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is "to foster the growth
and maintenance of an open world trading system .... " 19 U.S.C. § 2502 (Supp. III
1979). See also Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1976); Recip-
rocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C. § 1351-1354 (1976).
38. E.g., Tariff Act of 1930, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. III 1979) (providing
for countervailing duties); Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) (provid-
ing for United States International Trade Commission cease-and-desist or exclusion-
ary orders to curtail unfair import competition); Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. §
2251 (1976) (providing various forms of import relief); Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1976) (providing for presidential action where antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty statutes are inadequate to give relief from subsidized imports). In ad-
dition, government procurement of imports is prohibited in certain instances by the
federal Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976), as amended by 19 U.S.C. §§
2511-2518 (Supp. III 1979), and by various state buy American statutes. See, e.g.,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22(17) (Michie/Law. Co-op); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-18
(West).
39. Fair value is not defined by the statute, but is determined by the Com-
merce Department by reference to "foreign market value." 19 C.F.R. 353.1 (1980).
The foreign market value of goods is ordinarily the price, at the time such goods are
exported to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is sold, or, in
the absence of sales, offered for sale in the principal markets of the exporting coun-
try in usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade. 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979). If such goods are not sold in significant quantities for
home consumption, then the price at which such goods are sold or offered for sale
for export to countries other than the United States will be used. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B).
If Commerce determines that home market or third country standards cannot be ap-
plied, then foreign market value will be determined by the "constructed value" of
the goods. Id. § 1677b(a)(2). Constructed value is the sum of: (1) the cost of materials
and processing, (2) an amount for expenses calculated at not less than ten percent of
such cost, (3) an amount for profit not less than eight percent of the sum of such gen-
eral expenses and cost, and (4) the cost of packaging and other incidental expenses.
Id. § 1677b(e). Special rules are provided for state-controlled economies, certain
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the Antidumping Act of 1921 and its successor antidumping pro-
visions (the Antidumping Law) in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979.40
Although the Antidumping Act of 1921 was amended several
times4' and finally repealed, 42 its fundamental provision survives
substantially unchanged in the new law. The current statute pro-
vides that:
If-
(1) the administering authority [Commerce Department] deter-
mines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or
is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the [International Trade] Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured,4 3 or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an
antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an
multinational corporations, sampling techniques, and adjustments to prices for differ-
ences in conditions of sale. See generally id. § 1677b.
40. USITC Pub. 951, supra note 14, at 30; see note 24 supra.
41. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043 (1975); Act of Aug. 14,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-630, 72 Stat. 583; Customs Simplification Act of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 768, 68 Stat. 1138.
42. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 1980).
43. Addition of the word "material" to modify "injury" is the principal change
made by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in the original wording of the provision.
This change brought the language into harmony with art. VI of GATT, supra note 36,
and art. III of the International Antidumping Code, supra note 36. It is doubtful,
however, whether this change will influence future determinations by the Commis-
sion. Remarks of Bill Alberger, Vice-Chairman (now Chairman) of the International
Trade Commission, at the Practicing Law Institute on Basics of Antidumping and
Other Import Relief Laws: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Update, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 9, 1979). See also H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979). "In
the Committee's view, the ITC's decisions from January 3, 1975 to July 2, 1979 have,
on the whole, been consistent with the material injury test of this legislation and the
agreement. The Committee intends that standard to continue." Id. In the past, the
Commission has found injury even where United States producers retained their rel-
ative share of the market. Electric Golf Carts from Poland, United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission Pub. No. 740, Investigation No. AA1921-147 (Sept. 16,
1975).
[Vol. 4:289
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amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value
exceeds the United States price for the merchandise. 44
The new statute thus charges the Commerce Department with
making dumping determinations, and the International Trade Com-
mission with making determinations as to injury. 45 As under the
1921 Act, the procedures leading to the imposition of dumping du-
ties are carefully prescribed.4 6
An investigation may be commenced on the Commerce De-
partment's own initiative, 47 or as the result of a petition48 filed by
an "interested party"49 on behalf of an industry. 50 The Commerce
Department is given considerable latitude in determining whether
to self-initiate an investigation. 51 In the case of a petition filed on
behalf of an industry, the petitioner must allege the elements nec-
essary for the imposition of dumping duties, and must support the
allegations with information reasonably available to the peti-
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979).
45. The "administering authority" referred to in the statute is defined as "the
Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the United States to whom the re-
sponsibility for carrying out the duties of the administering authority under this sub-
title are transferred by law." Id. § 1677. Authority to administer the statute was later
transferred to the Commerce Department. See note 8 supra.
46. Compare Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170a (1976) (repealed
1979) with Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673e (Supp. III 1979).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (Supp. III 1979).
48. Id. § 1673a(b).
49. The term "interested party" is defined to include United States manufactur-
ers, producers, or wholesalers of the product in question, trade or business associa-
tions of such parties, and certified or recognized unions or groups of workers repre-
sentative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale of
such product in the United States. Id. § 1677(9).
50. "Industry" refers to the domestic producers as a whole of the product in
question. Id. § 1677(4). For purposes of injury, however, the United States may in
appropriate circumstances be divided into two or more markets comprising "regional
industries," which are treated as though they were separate industries. Id. §
16 7 7 (4)(c).
51. The statute requires Commerce to self-initiate an investigation "whenever
[it] determines, from information available to it, that a formal investigation is
warranted into the question of whether the elements necessary for the imposition of
a duty under section 731 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] exist." Id. § 1673a(a). Similar
broad discretion existed under the Antidumping Act of 1921. See Antidumping Act of
1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160(c)(1) (1976) (repealed 1979). Though such discretion seems
arbitrary, it has consistently withstood constitutional challenges. Kreutz v. Duming,
69 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1934); C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438
(C.C.P.A. 1934).
298 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:289
tioner.5 2 If the petition is in order, the Commerce Department
must commence its investigation within 20 days after filing.5 3
Once the Commerce Department announces the commence-
ment of an investigation, the Commission must make a preliminary
injury determination 54 within 45 days after the date the petition
was filed. 55 If that determination is affirmative, 56 the Commerce
Department must make a preliminary determination as to sales at
less than fair value 57 within 160 days after the date the petition was
filed, 58 unless the time is extended. 59
Upon an affirmative preliminary less-than-fair-value determina-
tion by the Commerce Department, an order will be issued sus-
pending liquidation60 of new customs entries of the product in
question, thus postponing until the conclusion of the investigation
the final determination of the total duties collectible on such
imports.61 From the date of this affirmative preliminary less-than-
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (Supp. III 1979).
53. Id. § 1673a(c).
54. The preliminary injury determination is whether "there is a reasonable in-
dication that-(1) an industry in the United States (A) is materially injured, or (B) is
threatened with material injury, or (2) the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded" by reason of the imports of the merchandise in ques-
tion. Id. § 1673b(a).
55. Id. In the case of investigations self-initiated by Commerce, this determina-
tion must be made within 45 days after the date on which the Commission receives
notice of the investigation. Id.
56. A negative injury determination by the Commission terminates the investi-
gation. Id.
57. The preliminary less-than-fair-value determination is whether "there is a
reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the merchandise is being sold, or is likely
to be sold at less than fair value." Id. § 1673b(b)(1). An affirmative determination
must include the estimated dumping margin. Id.
58. Id. Where the investigations are self-initiated by Commerce, this determi-
nation must be made within 160 days after the investigation began, but not before an
affirmative preliminary injury determination by the Commission. Id. Either period
may be shortened where the petitioner and any interested parties waive verification
of information received by Commerce, and Commerce finds that sufficient informa-
tion is on the record to make its preliminary determination. Id. § 1673b(b)(2).
59. The period of investigation may be extended, in extraordinarily compli-
cated cases, by up to 50 days. Id. § 1673b(c)(1).
60. Id. § 1673b(d)(1). The term "liquidation" refers to the closing of the cus-
toms file on an import entry. Upon liquidation, the amount of duty payable is conclu-
sively fixed. 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1980).
61. A negative preliminary less-than-fair-value determination by Commerce
does not close the investigation, but it does have the effect of postponing any sus-
pension of liquidation of entries until an affirmative final determination is made. 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979). The practical effects of this finding are dis-
cussed at notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
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fair-value determination, estimated dumping duties or equivalent
security must be deposited in an amount equal to the estimated av-
erage dumping margin. 62 In certain cases, the suspension of liqui-
dation will apply retroactively to merchandise imported during the
90 days prior to the order suspending liquidation. 63
Within 75 days after its preliminary fair value determination,
the Commerce Department makes its final determination regarding
sales at less than fair value. 64 If the final determination is affirma-
tive, 65 the Commission must make its final injury determination,
usually not later than 75 days after the date of the Commerce De-
partment's final determination. 66 An affirmative final determination
by the Commission requires the Commerce Department to issue
an Antidumping Duty Order within seven days, directing the Cus-
toms Service to assess dumping duties on the imported merchan-
dise.6 7 Depending on the findings of the Commission, such duties
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979). The average dumping margin in
statutory terms is the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United
States price. Id.
63. Id. § 1673b(e)(2). Retroactive suspension will be granted where there is an
allegation by petitioner and a determination by Commerce of "critical circum-
stances," such as a history of dumping of the class of merchandise in question, or ac-
tual or imputed knowledge by the importer that the goods were exported at less than
fair value, or "massive exports" of such goods over a relatively short period of time.
Id. § 1673b(e)(1).
64. Id. § 1673d(a)(1). Upon application by exporters or the petitioner, Com-
merce may in its discretion postpone the determination. Id. § 1673d(a)(2).
65. A negative less-than-fair-value determination by Commerce terminates the
investigation. Id. § 1673d(c)(2).
66. See id. § 1673d(b)(3). Where the preliminary less-than-fair-value determina-
tion by Commerce was affirmative, the Commission deadline for assessing injury is
the later of 120 days from the date of the preliminary Commerce determination, or
45 days from the date of the final Commerce determination. Id. § 1673d(b)(2). Where
the preliminary determination by Commerce was negative, the final determination as
to injury by the Commission must be made within 75 days of the final less-than-fair-
value determination by Commerce. Id. § 1673d(b)(3).
67. Id. § 167 3 e(a). Upon final determination of less-than-fair-value sales and
publication of an Antidumping Duty Order, estimated antidumping duties must be
deposited with Customs pending liquidation. Id. §§ 1673e(a)(3), 1673g(a). Unlike the
deposit required after an affirmative preliminary less-than-fair-value determination,
which can be made by posting a bond or other security, this deposit must be made
in cash. Id.; see note 62 supra and accompanying text. This conditional cash deposit
is held until Commerce calculates the antidumping duties payable on each entry and
makes a final duty assessment. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673g, 1675a(2) (Supp. III 1979). The
United States Customs Service, a branch of the Treasury Department, is charged
with assisting the Commerce Department in the administration of the Antidumping
Law. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,803 (1980).
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will be assessed either prospectively only, 68 or retroactively to in-
clude all entries for which liquidation has been suspended. 69
The antidumping law provides several safeguards to assure due
process and to avoid unjust results. These include termination or
suspension of investigations in certain circumstances, 70 opportuni-
ties for interested parties to be heard during the course of an in-
vestigation, 7' various procedural safeguards72 and appellate review
of administrative determinations. 73
Although the substantive provisions of the United States
Antidumping Law provide ultimate relief from unfair import com-
petition, the impact of the law is felt almost immediately upon the
commencement of an antidumping investigation. 74 During the
68. Where the Commission finds threat of material injury only, and not threat
of material injury which would have led to a finding of material injury but for the
suspension of liquidation under § 1673b(d)(1), duties will be assessed prospectively.
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(b) (Supp. III 1979).
69. Where the Commission finds either material injury, or threat of material in-
jury which would have led to a finding of material injury but for the suspension
of liquidation under § 1673b(d)(1), duties will be assessed retroactively. Id. §
1673e(b)(1).
70. Termination is permitted in the discretion either of the Commission or of
Commerce upon withdrawal of the petition by the petitioner, except that the Com-
mission may not terminate the investigation until after a preliminary determination
by Commerce. Id. § 1673c(a). Commerce may suspend an investigation, subject to
later review, where substantially all the exports of the goods in question will be
ceased by agreement of the exporters, or where prices will be raised by their agree-
ment to eliminate any dumping margin. Id. § 1673c(b). Where Commerce decides
that suspension of an investigation will be more beneficial to the domestic industry
than continuation of the investigation, and the investigation is complex, Commerce
may suspend an investigation if the exporters agree that prices on substantially all
exports of the goods in question will be raised to levels not suppressing or
undercutting domestic prices, the dumping margin on each entry will not exceed
15% of the average dumping margin found during the course of the investigation,
and export quantities will not increase. Commerce may not accept such an agree-
ment unless it is satisfied that suspension is in the public interest and effective mon-
itoring of the agreement is practical. Id. § 1673c(c), (d).
71. Id. § 1677c.
72. These include preventing disclosure of confidential information, see, e.g., §
1673b(d)(3); notice requirements, see, e.g., id. § 1673b(f); and administrative review
of determinations, id. § 1675.
73. Judicial review of determinations is available under § 516A of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. An interested party who is a party to the proceeding may
file an action in the United States Customs Court (now the United States Court of
International Trade) contesting administrative findings at various stages in the course
of an investigation. Id.
74. Consider the position of an importer who is offered goods subject to a
pending antidumping investigation. He accepts such an offer at the risk of paying
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course of an investigation, the bottom-line price of the imported
goods in question is rendered uncertain, thus discouraging their
sale and importation while the authorities seek to measure any
dumping margin which may exist. 75 From the date of a preliminary
finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that
there are sales at less than fair value, any imports of the goods in
question are released by customs officials only upon posting of a
bond sufficient to cover potential antidumping duties. 76 It has been
said that importers regard the restrictions imposed pursuant to the
investigation as more onerous than the penalties to which they may
become subject if dumping is eventually established. 77 The natural
consequence of the restrictions is the curtailment of imports of
such goods long before the final less-than-fair-value and material
injury determinations are made. 78
This "procedural protectionism," as it has been called, 79 is
matched by a potential for "substantive protectionism.- 80 Orienta-
tion of the Antidumping Law toward effect rather than intent has
facilitated enforcement, 81 but it has also given the Antidumping
Law the potential to curtail dumping of virtually any kind,82 rather
dumping duties in an amount equal to the dumping margin finally determined by
Commerce. See note 67 supra. These duties in many cases threaten to be
prohibitively high. For example, in the antidumping petition of United States Steel
Corporation against seven European steel exporting countries, margins as high as
82.5% of the export price were alleged. See United States International Trade Com-
mission, Pub. No. 1064, Preliminary Determination of the Commission in Investiga-
tions Nos. 731-TA-18 - 24, Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom (1980), app. A-20, Table 2 [hereinafter cited as USITC Pub. 1064].
75. See Barcelo, supra note 26, at 523; Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 60.
76. See note 62 supra; see also note 67 supra.
77. Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 60-61.
78. For example, the 1978 Treasury Department affirmative preliminary less-
than-fair-value determination regarding carbon steel plates from Japan "resulted in a
virtual halt in orders for that product from the foreign suppliers." Solomon Report,
supra note 1, at 12-13. Imports of carbon steel plate dropped to 201,844 tons in 1978,
down from an average of over 700,000 tons during the three preceding years. See
American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report (1978), at 47 [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Statistical Report]; Annual Statistical Report (1977), at 47 [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Statistical Report]; Annual Statistical Report (1976), at 47; Annual Sta-
tistical Report (1975), at 47.
79. Barcelo, supra note 26, at 522.
80. Id. at 520-22.
81. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 58-59.
82. For example, "persistent" dumping, the practice of systematic, extended
sale for export at prices below those charged in the home market, though it may be
of great economic advantage to both the exporting and the importing nation, and may
19:81]
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than focusing on the intermittent predatory dumping which econo-
mists agree is harmful to competition.83 For example, the operative
concepts "material injury"8' 4 and "industry"85 can be so interpreted
by the Commission that the loss of profits by one regional domestic
producer might constitute "material injury" to an "industry," and
subject a foreign manufacturer's goods to antidumping duties wher-
ever they are imported in the United States even though predatory
intent is lacking and the lower-priced imports may be beneficial in
other regions.86
Despite the potential use of the Antidumping Law as a protec-
tionist instrument, and despite several outstanding dumping find-
ings with respect to foreign steel products,8 7 the Commission
stated in a recent study that the great bulk of imports of steel mill
products remains unaffected by United States trade laws. 88 Pres-
sures were increasingly brought to bear on the government by the
United States steel industry to augment the protectionist thrust of
those laws.89 In December, 1977, under extraordinary pressure,
the Carter Administration devised the TPM to protect the industry
from low-priced import competition.9 "
D. The Trigger Price Mechanism
To understand the TPM it is necessary first to recognize that it
was originally conceived as a compromise and as an emergency
measure to deal with complex problems and competing policy con-
siderations. The year 1977 marked a new low in the decline of the
United States steel industry. Steel imports rose to an unprece-
be motivated by non-predatory considerations, may conceivably cause harm to a
competing domestic industry and be curtailed by the application of the Antidumping
Law. Where antidumping duties halt persistent dumping, they become a protective
tariff and reduce each nation's gains from trade, according to international trade
theory. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 47-48.
83. Id. at 48.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (Supp. I1 1979).
85. Id. § 1677(4).
86. See Baier, supra note 29, at 421; Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 67-70; United
States International Trade Commission Pub. No. 970, Determination of the Commis-
sion in Investigation No. AA 1921-197, Carbon Steel Plate from Taiwan, reprinted in
44 Fed. Reg. 29,734 (1979).
87. See 19 C.F.R. 153.45 (1980).
88. See USITC Pub. 951, supra note 14, at 30.
89. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 12-13.
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1977); See generally Note, Effective Enforcement of
U.S. Antidumping Laws: The Development and Legal Implications of Trigger
Pricing, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 969 (1978).
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dented level, 91 while as many as 20,000 steel workers were left un-
employed by plant closings and other cutbacks. 92 Five of the na-
tion's fifteen largest steel companies recorded net losses for the
year. 93 In their annual reports for 1977, most steel companies at-
tributed lost earnings to steel imports. 94 By December, 1977, an
unprecedented number of complaints filed by domestic steel
companies under the Antidumping Act of 1921 were pending 95 and
more were threatened, 96 jeopardizing trade relations with the prin-
cipal trading partners of the United States. 97
Allowing the pending and threatened antidumping investiga-
tions to be pursued to their conclusion might have closed the
United States market to steel imports9" at a time when Japan and
the European Economic Community were lagging behind the
United States in their recovery from recession, 99 and just before
critical negotiations in the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade100 were to take place. 10 1 Moreover, the do-
mestic steel industry had criticized the traditional antidumping
procedures as "too cumbersome to provide relief quickly from sud-
91. 1977 Statistical Report, supra note 78, at 8, Table LA.
92. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
93. Price Waterhouse & Co., 1978 Survey of Financial Reporting and Account-
ing Developments in the Steel Industry of America 3 [hereinafter cited as Price
Waterhouse 1978 Survey].
94. See id. at 7-9.
95. Between January 1, 1975, and December 6, 1977, when the Solomon Re-
port was published, 19 separate antidumping complaints had been submitted to the
Treasury Department, of which only one had reached the point of a preliminary de-
termination of sales at less than fair value. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 4-5. Be-
tween October 19, 1977, and January 23, 1978, 16 antidumping complaints were filed
concerning nine basic steel products from France, Japan, Belgium, West Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. U.S. Department of Treasury, Steel
Trigger Price Mechanism: A One-Year Review for the Steel Tripartite Committee,
Attachment A (1979) [hereinafter cited as TPM Review] (copy on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). These 16 complaints were withdrawn shortly
after TPM protection was provided to the domestic industry. See note 147 infra and
accompanying text.
96. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 4.
97. Id. at 5.
98. See id.; notes 74-82 supra and accompanying text.
99. See Affidavit of Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of the Treasury 3,
6, Great Lakes Terminal Ass'n v. Blumenthal, No. C79-165 (D. Ohio July 6, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Affidavit of Anthony M. Solomon].
100. GATT, supra note 36. While passed in 1947, GATT has been reexamined
and updated by the signatories in two lengthy sets of multilateral negotiations:
1964-67 ("the Kennedy Round"), and 1973-79 ("the Tokyo Round").
101. See Affidavit of Anthony M. Solomon, supra note 99, 8.
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den surges of imports that may cause injury,"' 02 and too product-
specific to prevent foreign suppliers from shifting export production
to products outside the scope of a particular investigation. 10 3
1. Purpose and Operation of the TPM
In October, 1977, President Carter appointed an Interagency
Task Force, headed by Under Secretary of the Treasury for Mone-
tary Affairs, Anthony M. Solomon, to consider the conditions af-
fecting the United States steel industry and to recommend reme-
dial measures.104 The President approved the recommendations of
the Task Force report10 5 on the date of its release.106 The solution
proposed by the Task Force for the industry's import problem was
intended to prevent future injury to the domestic steel industry
while permitting foreign producers to continue to sell their prod-
ucts in the United States market. ' 0 7 Specifically, the Task Force rec-
ommended:
[T]hat the Department of Treasury, in administering the
Antidumping Act, set up a system of trigger prices, based on the
full costs of production including appropriate capital charges of
steel mill products by the most efficient foreign steel producers
(currently the Japanese steel industry), which would be used as a
basis for monitoring imports of steel into the United States and
for initiating accelerated antidumping investigations with respect
to imports priced below the trigger prices. 108
The basic operation of the TPM as implemented' 0 9 closely
tracks the procedures suggested by the Task Force."10 Trigger
prices are published for discrete steel mill product classifications
based upon cost data made available by Japanese steel produc-
ers,111 and are adjusted each quarter to reflect changes in produc-
tion or other costs or in the dollar/yen exchange rate (within a five
102. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 12.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Affidavit of Anthony M. Solomon, supra note 99, 2.
105. See note 1 supra.
106. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PrEs. Doc. 1835 (Dec. 6, 1977).
107. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 8, 18.
108. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
109. See note I supra.
110. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 14-16.
111. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464 (1978). Cost data are supplied by the Japanese Ministry
of International Trade and Industry. Id.
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percent flexibility band to smooth out sharp fluctuations).1 1 2 These
prices are identical for all importers regardless of source, and are
constructed on a cost-insurance-freight basis using Japanese freight
and insurance costs to each of the four coastal regions (including
the Great Lakes) of the United States. l" 3 Importers are required to
present at entry a "Special Steel Summary Invoice" (SSSI) 114 which
simplifies comparison of import prices with the trigger prices, and
to certify on that invoice that no rebate, drawbacks, or unrelated
incentives have been or are to be paid or granted in connection
with the import transaction. 115
A Special Customs Steel Task Force (SCSTF) was established
to administer the TPM. 116 If the total price shown on an SSSI is
lower than the applicable trigger price, the SCSTF forwards infor-
mation regarding that importation to the Commerce Department in
Washington for further investigation. 117 If warranted, the Com-
merce Department will self-initiate a formal antidumping investiga-
tion within a few weeks."l 8 The Interagency Task Force expected
that information obtained in connection with the administration of
the TPM would enable the administering authority to conclude its
formal investigation within a much shorter time than that allowed
for normal antidumping investigations. 119
112. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,180 (1979). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464, 1,468 (1978).
113. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,180 (1979).
114. 19 C.F.R. § 141.89(b) (1980); see note 1 supra.
115. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,216 (1977).
116. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (1977).
117. See id. The administrative functions originally assigned to the Treasury
Department were transferred to the Commerce Department by Executive Order. See
note 8 supra.
118. Id.
119. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 16. The Interagency Task Force contem-
plated that under this "fast track" investigation, action could be taken within 60 or
90 days, as opposed to the potential 13-month period required for normal Treasury
and Commission procedures under the Antidumping Act of 1921. Id.; see note 102
supra and accompanying text. The TPM has produced four such fast track investiga-
tions to date. The first of these, involving carbon steel plate from Spain, was begun
on October 20, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978), and was terminated on November
16, 1978, after a determination by Treasury that the bulk of the sales in question
were at or above the applicable trigger price. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,315 (1978). Another in-
vestigation, involving carbon steel plate from Poland, was begun on the same date,
43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978), and ended with a negative final injury determination by
the Commission on June 18, 1979, following an affirmative final determination by
Treasury of sales at less than fair value. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,564 (1979). A third investi-
gation, involving carbon steel plate from Taiwan, was commenced with the Spanish
and Polish plate investigation, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978), and resulted in final af-
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The TPM was intended to be consistent with the overall ob-
jectives of the Interagency Task Force's program, including "main-
taining an open world trading environment based upon normal
trading practices," while enforcing domestic trade laws in a manner
"effective and responsive to the requirements of suppliers and con-
sumers alike." 120 It was the declared aim of the Solomon Report's
program, moreover, to "help create an environment within which a
free industry can operate efficiently," but to avoid the danger of
"any direct government involvement in the industry's deci-
sions.- 121 The program also sought to "avoid measures which stim-
ulate inflation. . . [Its implementation] should not contribute to
unnecessary and disruptive price increases at the expense of do-
mestic consumers and the economy as a whole." 122 The Inter-
agency Task Force recommendations emphasized that the TPM
would not be a "minimum price" system, and that none of its
terms were keyed to the statutory definitions of "foreign market
'value" or "constructed value." 123 The TPM was, the report said,
fully consistent with existing statutory law. 124
It can be seen, from statements made by Treasury officials in
conjunction with the implementation of the TPM and afterwards,
that the success of the system depends upon the reliability of two
firmative determinations of sales at less than fair value on February 7, 1979, 44 Fed.
Reg. 9,639 (1979), and material injury on May 16, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,734 (1979).
The last investigation, involving steel wire nails from South Korea, was commenced
April 13, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,621 (1979). On October 19, 1979, the Treasury De-
partment published its preliminary determination that, with the exception of one of
the 12 Korean manufacturers involved, there was no reason to believe or suspect that
the nails were sold at less than fair value. 44 Fed. Reg. 61,722 (1979). As to the one
exception, the investigation was tentatively discontinued because of minimal dump-
ing margins and assurances that future sales would not be at less than fair value. Id.
On May 23, 1980, after authority to administer the Antidumping Law shifted from
Treasury to Commerce, see note 8 supra, Commerce made the final determination
that six of the manufacturers involved made less-than-fair-value sales. 45 Fed. Reg.
34,941 (1980). The investigation ended on August 1, 1980, with a negative injury de-
termination. 45 Fed. Reg. 53,924 (1980). For further discussion of these investigations,
see generally Comptroller General, Report to the Congress on the Administration of
the Steel Trigger Price Mechanism (July 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report];
Note, The Initial Antidumping Investigations under the Trigger Price Mechanism,
13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433 (1979).
120. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 8.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 17; see note 39 supra.
124. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 17. The Interagency Task Force was
referring to the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (repealed 1979).
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basic assumptions upon which the TPM was based. 125 An analysis
of these assumptions will permit a sharper focus than has hereto-
fore been obtained on the relationship of the TPM to existing
United States trade law.
2. Assumptions Underlying the TPM
The first of the two assumptions upon which the TPM rests is
that no injury will be caused by imported steel products entering
the United States market at prices reflecting the full production,
transportation, and capital costs, plus a reasonable profit, of the
most efficient foreign producers; or, at least, that domestic pro-
ducers may not be able to prove injury due to imports at such
prices. 126
Domestic steel producers have argued that the United States
steel industry, despite its inefficiencies and need for moderniza-
tion, is fully able to compete with fair-priced imports from any for-
eign source.1 27 If that is so, the Task Force reasoned, then main-
taining import prices at the level of the full costs of Japanese
imports will prevent injury.128 It was anticipated that the TPM
would markedly increase imported steel prices.' 29 Domestic pro-
ducers, if they did not too sharply increase their own prices, would
thus be able to recapture a substantial portion of the importers'
market share. ' 30 Yet the TPM would also permit domestic produc-
ers to raise their prices to some degree, improving profit mar-
gins. 131 Increased market share would augment the rate of capacity
125. See generally, e.g., Steel Industry Hearings, supra note 1; Ehrenhaft, In-
troductory Note on the United States Department of the Treasury "Trigger Price
Mechanism" for Imported Steel Mill Products, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 952 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TPM Introductory Note]; Solomon Report, supra note 1;
Briefing by Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Af-
fairs, Office of the White House Press Secretary (Dec. 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
White House Briefing]; Dep't of the Treasury News, Feb. 10, 1978; id., Jan. 27,
1978; Affidavit of Anthony M. Solomon, supra note 99; Am. Metal Mkt., Dec. 9,
1977, at 1, col. 1.
126. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 18.
127. See Steel Industry Hearings, supra note 1, at 83; TPM Introductory Note,
supra note 125, at 953.
128. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 18.
129. See id. at 19. Prices did, in fact, increase markedly. See notes 156-57 infra
and accompanying text.
130. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 19. See also Dep't of the Treasury News,
Feb. 10, 1978.
131. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 19; see Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 3,
col. 2.
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utilization and restore jobs to American steelworkers. 13 2 By most
injury criteria, therefore, injury to the domestic industry would be
eliminated by the TPM.133
The second basic assumption underlying the TPM is that for-
eign producers would voluntarily maintain their prices at or above
trigger price levels. 134 In part, this assumption relies on the "pro-
cedural protectionism" inherent to antidumping investigations: for-
eign producers would prefer losing some of their market share in
the United States to running the risk of a fast-track antidumping
investigation whose preliminary dumping determination would in
short order close the market to them.135 Indeed, for many foreign
producers, the TPM offered the means by which they would avoid
running the full course of investigations already pending against
them. 136 Finally, the prospect of higher prices providing a greater
return on sales to the United States would provide importers some
compensation for their loss in United States market share. 137
132. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 19; see note 92 supra and accompanying
text.
133. The most important standards for injury applied by the International
Trade Commission under the Antidumping Act of 1921 included price suppression
and invasion of the market with adverse effect on domestic production. Comment,
Comparison of Standards for Injury Under Escape Clause Procedure and the
Antidumping Act, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 435, 440-41 (1968). The antidumping provi-
sions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prescribe factors which the Commission
must take into account, including the volume of imports, effects of those imports on
prices, and impact on domestic producers, among others. Evaluation of the factors is
likewise described in some detail. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (Supp. III 1979).
134. The Solomon Report emphasized that the TPM was not intended to be a
"minimum price" system. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 17. It is clear, how-
ever, that the success of the system depended on its ability to set a floor price for
imports. See notes 239-41 infra and accompanying text. There is also persuasive evi-
dence that it actually operated as a price-setting system. See notes 243-53 infra and
accompanying text.
135. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text; Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at
61. "Withholding of appraisement necessarily creates uncertainty. It is a major deter-
rent, often more feared than the imposition of the duty." Bills to Amend Certain Pro-
visions of the Antidumping Act, Hearings on H.R. 6006, 6007, and 5120 Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1957) (statement by
Ass't Secretary of Treasury Kendall).
136. Treasury Department officials made it clear that the TPM would continue
to operate only if pending antidumping suits were dropped. See, e.g., White House
Briefing, supra note 125; Am. Metal Mkt., Dec. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1; notes 144-47 in-
fra and accompanying text.
137. See text accompanying notes 156-57 infra. In fact, the market share of
imports actually increased by a small margin in 1978. American Iron and Steel Insti-
tute, Annual Statistical Report (1979), at 8, Table IA [hereinafter cited as 1979 Statis-
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3. Compromises Incorporated in the TPM
While the accuracy of these assumptions made by the Task
Force may be questioned, it is clear that they are the warp and
woof of the compromise woven in the TPM. This compromise has
three basic aspects.
First, while the TPM was designed to prevent injury, it was
equally designed to permit technical dumping.' 3 8 By definition the
trigger price is below the fair value of the products of any but the
most efficient foreign producer.' 39 Thus, a European steel pro-
ducer, for example, whose production costs may be substantially
higher than those of the most efficient producer, and whose trans-
portation costs are the same or similar, is permitted to sell below
his costs because it may be impossible for domestic producers to
prove injury due to sales at the trigger price.140 In this sense, the
trigger price is a compromise price. 141 An inefficient foreign pro-
tical Report]. This increase may be accounted for by the unusually high capacity util-
ization rate of domestic mills, i.e., 86.8%. Id. The market share of imports did drop
markedly in 1979, down to 15.2% from 18.1% the year before. Id.
138. "Technical dumping" is a term of art applied in injury determinations by
the International Trade Commission. See, e.g., International Trade Commission, Pub.
No. 744, Vinyl Clad Fence Fabric from Canada, Inv. No. AA 1921-148 (1975). It is
used here in the broad sense in which it is used in the legislative history of the
Antidumping Act, i.e., selling an imported product at a price not lower than is
needed to make the product competitive in the United States market, but below its
fair value. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7316; see note 39 supra.
139. The definition is not altogether pragmatic, however. Since transportation
costs are an important component of import steel costs, relative proximity to a partic-
ular coastal region of the United States may enable a producer less efficient than the
Japanese to sell here at prices above fair value but below trigger prices. Thus, cer-
tain Canadian steel producers were able to gain "preclearance" to sell below trigger
prices without risk. See TPM Review, supra note 95, at 7 n.13; GAO Report, supra
note 119, at 12-14.
140. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 18. The reasoning of the Task Force
may have been as follows: sales by less efficient European producers at the trigger
price merely replace imports by the Japanese, who, at that price, would in all likeli-
hood be selling at or above fair value. Thus, European sales cannot be said to cause
injury to the domestic industry, since, in their absence, they would be replaced by
non-dumping Japanese sales. Similar reasoning was employed by the United States
Tariff Commission in making negative injury determinations in the wire rod
antidumping cases of the 1960's. See Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from
Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,474 (1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from
Luxembourg, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,476 (1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from
West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,606 (1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from
France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7,368 (1963).
141. See General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission,
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ducer who complies with the TPM does not thereby raise the
prices on his products to their full "fair value," but compliance
with the TPM assures that the price at which he sells will not be
less than a price with which the domestic industry can compete. 142
Second, although foreign producers voluntarily selling at trig-
ger prices may as a result lose some of their market share in the
United States, they are nonetheless assured that the market will
not be closed to them by the procedural barrier of an antidumping
investigation. This assurance is provided by the third and most im-
portant aspect of the TPM compromise: the agreement on the part
of United States steel producers to drop their pending antidumping
complaints, and to refrain from filing new petitions, in exchange for
the protection of the TPM. 143
There can be no doubt that the government, from the start,
intended to provide TPM protection only as a substitute for broad
industry-filed antidumping complaints. The Task Force report itself
stated:
Implementation of the trigger price mechanism should result in
a substantial elimination of the injury the steel industry claims it
is presently suffering due to sales of imported steel below its
"fair value." This should, in turn, eliminate the need for the do-
mestic steel companies to file new antidumping complaints and
encourage them to consider the prompt withdrawal of the peti-
tions now under investigation .... 144
The Administration made it apparent in its public statements re-
garding the TPM that the "encouragement" it offered the domestic
industry to withdraw its antidumping petitions amounted to an
ultimatum: the United States steel producers would not enjoy the
Memorandum to Commissioner Catherine Bedell on the Proposed "Reference Price"
Antidumping, Plan 2 (Nov. 28, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ITC Memorandum].
142. See notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Korf Indus., Inc. v. Klutznick, No. 80-0898 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980).
Korf Industries, a domestic steel producer, sued for reinstatement of the TPM follow-
ing its suspension in March, 1980, claiming that its prior decision to drop a pending
antidumping complaint was consideration given for TPM protection in a "contract"
with the government. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18; Points
and Authorities in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at 7-9. Other domestic steelmakers noted the
implementation of the TPM in their letters withdrawing antidumping complaints.
See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 47,041 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,052 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg.
30,956 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 9212 (1978).
144. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 18.
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benefits of the TPM unless the petitions were dropped. 145 The rea-
son given was that the Treasury Department lacked the resources
both to administer the TPM and to investigate the petitions filed
by the industry. 146
Within months after the implementation of the TPM, sixteen
antidumping complaints pending when the TPM was introduced
were withdrawn. 147 In accepting the reprieve from aggressive for-
eign steel pricing afforded by the TPM, the domestic steel industry
petitioners settled for less than the full statutory relief offered by
the Antidumping Law.
4. Effects of the TPM
It is hazardous to attribute the trends in an industry to any
single trade or economic factor. Indeed, reviews of the early per-
formance of the TPM differ widely in their estimates of its effec-
tiveness. 148 Nevertheless, given the gloomy outlook for the United
States steel industry prior to 1978,149 its remarkable recovery dur-
ing the period of rising trigger prices in the first year the system
was in operation, 150 and the industry's flat performance in 1979
when trigger prices remained fairly static, 151 it is fair to say that
the administration of the TPM has been an important factor in
determining the condition of the United States steel market.
145. Solomon Puts Choice: 'Dumping Suits or Reference Prices', Am. Metal
Mkt., Dec. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Indeed, when the first major antidumping petitions
subsequent to the implementation of the TPM were filed, the TPM was suspended.
See note 9 supra. In a press release explaining the suspension, the Commerce De-
partment noted that: "[the TPM] was designed as a substitute for individual
antidumping petitions by the domestic steel industry." Dep't of Commerce News,
Mar. 21, 1980.
146. See Suspension of the Steel Trigger Price Mechanism, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150
(1980); Dep't of the Treasury News, Jan. 27, 1978.
147. TPM Review, supra note 95, at Attachment A; 43 Fed. Reg. 47,041 (1978);
43 Fed. Reg. 37,052 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 30,956 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 9212 (1978).
148. Compare TPM Review, supra note 95, with GAO Report, supra note 119.
149. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text. List prices of domestic steel
products rose by 9.6% in 1977. See IRON AGE, Jan. 1, 1979, at 76 (measured by Iron
Age Finished Steel Composite Price). Nonetheless, industry profits fell. Price
Waterhouse 1978 Survey, supra note 93, at 3.
150. Trigger prices rose from an average of $297.80 per ton in February, 1978,
to $352.48 for the first quarter 1979. TPM Review, supra note 95, Attachment C.
151. Trigger prices actually declined in 1979, from an average of $352.48 per
ton for the first quarter to $347.54 for the fourth quarter. GAO Report, supra note
119, at 3. In the first quarter of 1980, trigger prices rose to $358.31. Dep't of the
Treasury News, Nov. 20, 1979.
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In 1978 United States steelmakers logged their best results
since the boom of 1973-1974, marked by favorable developments in
raw steel production, capacity utilization, and profits.1 52 The most
dramatic change in 1978, however, was in the prices charged by
United States mills. Finished steel average list prices increased by
an enormous 15.3% by comparison with 1977.153 The increase from
December 1977 to December 1978 was even higher, at nearly
16.7%.154 Even these figures do not reveal the true magnitude at
price increases, because domestic mills discounted prices through-
out most of 1977. If discounts were as large as 5% (a conservative
estimate), the true increase in the prices of domestic mills would
have exceeded 20% in the year. 155 Meanwhile, trigger prices
greatly increased the cost of steel imports: in 1977, the average
price of imported steel was approximately $286 per ton; 156 in 1978,
the average price rose 25% to $327 per ton.157
The sharp rise in steel prices caused some alarm as the infla-
tionary effect of the TPM became apparent. 158 Although the sys-
tem was intended not to be inflationary, 159 it defies reason that an
industry whose annual sales exceed $40 billion, 60 whose size is
surpassed only by the automobile and petroleum industries, 161 and
upon which so many industries depend for their raw material,16 2
can increase its prices 15% or more without producing a serious
impact on inflation.
152. Raw steel production climbed 9% over 1977, making 1978 the third most
productive year in the history of the steel industry. See 1978 Statistical Report, supra
note 78, at 55. The average rate of capacity utilization in 1978 was 86.8%, compared
with 78.4% in the preceding year. Id. at 8, Table IA. Earnings of the six largest pro-
ducers totalled more than $1 billion, compared with an overall loss in 1977. IRON
AGE, Feb. 19, 1979, at 21.
153. IRON AGE, Jan. 1, 1979, at 76.
154. Id.
155. IRON AGE, May 22, 1978, at 43; Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 3, col. 2.
156. AMERICAN METAL MARKET, METAL STATISTICS 211 (1979).
157. Id.
158. Alfred E. Kahn, Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability un-
der President Carter, noted that the system "tends to be inflationary." Am. Metal
Mkt., Mar. 9, 1979, at 30, col. 1. When the TPM was first announced, Barry
Bosworth, Director of the Council, said it was "obvious that the steel industry
[would] continue to be a very serious problem" with regard to inflation. Remarks by
Barry Bosworth, White House Conference on Steel (Oct. 13, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as White House Conference].
159. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 8.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Other effects of the TPM brought protests from the parties ad-
versely affected. Among these effects was a geographical dislocation
of steel imports, shifting import tonnages from traditional trade
patterns. 163 Since trigger prices were established on a cost-
insurance-freight basis according to Japanese shipping costs, trigger
prices were higher where Japanese shipping distances were longer
and Japanese freight rates more costly. 164 Trigger prices were thus
lowest on the West Coast and highest in the Great Lakes re-
gion, 165 making foreign steel prices more attractive on the West
Coast and drawing business away from Great Lakes stevedores. 166
The potential for trade dislocation was obvious from the start.
West Coast steelmakers feared that the TPM would intensify
import competition in their market, 167 and they were right. West
Coast imports increased by more than 30% between 1977 and
1978.168 During 1978, imports captured 44% of the market
there. 169 California producer Kaiser Steel, especially hard hit,
"spurted red ink in 1978."170
Another change in steel trading patterns brought about by the
TPM was a shift by foreign steel sources to products not included
in the trigger price list.171 American steel fabricators, in particular,
163. See Great Lakes Terminal Ass'n v. Blumenthal, No. C79-165 (N.D. Ohio
July 6, 1979) (order denying preliminary injunction). In that action, plaintiffs Great
Lakes Terminal Association, a membership corporation consisting of 14 commercial
marine terminal companies which provide stevedoring and related services at all
principal Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway ports, Toledo Overseas Terminal,
Inc., a marine terminal operator in Toledo, Ohio, and Local 1982 of the International
Longshoremen's Association alleged that the TPM had "a profoundly distorting im-
pact on the importation of steel mill products through the four seacoasts" of the
United States, causing a decline in plaintiffs' share of the import trade. Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2-3, 6-7.
164. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 15.
165. U.S. Dep't of Treasury News 2 (May 25, 1978).
166. See Great Lakes Terminal Ass'n v. Blumenthal, No. C79-165 (N.D. Ohio
July 6, 1979). Imports of steel on the Great Lakes/Canadian border decreased 14.9%
in 1978 despite a 24.9% increase in overland steel imports from Canada. When Cana-
dian tonnages are removed from both 1977 and 1978 totals, the Great Lakes' loss
comes to 29.4%. See 1978 Statistical Report, supra note 78, at 47, 51; 1977 Statistical
Report, supra note 78, at 47, 49.
167. IRON AGE, Jan. 16, 1978, at 36.
168. See 1978 Statistical Report, supra note 78, at 51; 1977 Statistical Report,
supra note 78, at 49.
169. FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 108.
170. Id.
171. The trigger price list originally included products in 22 of 32 categories of
steel mill products established by the American Iron and Steel Institute. 42 Fed.
Reg. 65,214 (1977).
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protested that foreign steel suppliers became increasingly aggres-
sive in the sale of steel products pre-fabricated abroad, since these
were exempt from TPM coverage. 172 By December, 1978, for ex-
ample, imports of fabricated structural shapes increased 71% from
December of the year before. 173 Significantly, despite larger in-
creases in the price of basic steel products, the average value-per-
ton of these fabricated shapes increased only 3.5% from the previ-
ous year. 174
By making minor adjustments in the TPM, the government
was able to pacify some of the parties adversely affected by the
program. The TPM freight rate to the Great Lakes was adjusted
slightly downward, 175 and TPM protection was accorded to produc-
ers of "downstream" fabricated steel products. 176 But when the na-
tion's largest steel producer declared itself dissatisfied with TPM
protection, no small compromise would suffice.
On March 21, 1980, U.S. Steel Corporation filed antidumping
complaints against seven European countries, 177 alleging material
injury due to less-than-fair-value imports of a broad variety of steel
products.178 In its press release announcing the filing of its peti-
tions, U.S. Steel attacked the "structural inadequacy" of the TPM,
and noted that imports in the last quarter of 1979 rose to exceed
18% of United States apparent consumption. 179 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the press release decried the Commerce Department
decision, one day earlier, not to increase second quarter 1980 trig-
ger prices from first quarter levels. 180 Largely due to a decline of
the yen against the dollar, the level of trigger prices had not in-
creased by more than token amounts since the first quarter of
1979.181
172. IRON AGE, July 17, 1978, at 24.
173. See 1978 Statistical Report, supra note 78, at 45; 1977 Statistical Report,
supra note 78, at 45. This trend continued in 1979. See 1979 Statistical Report, supra
note 137, at 44.
174. See American Iron and Steel Institute, Imports of Iron and Steel Products,
Dec. 1978 (AIS Imports 1) (mimeographed ed.).
175. Dep't of Treasury News, May 25, 1978.
176. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 18,383 (1978) (announcing trigger prices for fabri-
cated wire products).
177. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150 (1980).
178. See USITC Pub. 1064, supra note 74, at 1.
179. United States Steel Public Affairs Release (Mar. 20, 1980).
180. Id. at 2.
181. Following a 7% increase in average trigger prices for the first quarter of
1979, the trigger price remained stable through the second quarter and declined dur-
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True to its earlier threats to suspend the TPM if large-scale
antidumping complaints were filed by domestic producers, the gov-
ernment promptly responded to the U.S. Steel announcement by
discontinuing the TPM. 182  When, months later, U.S. Steel
dropped the complaints i8 3 and reinstatement of the TPM could be
announced, 184  other and more tangible adjustments were em-
bodied in the TPM.
E. The New "Improved" TPM
Three basic changes were made in the TPM upon its
reinstatement: the duration of the system was extended, adminis-
trative procedures were strengthened, and a new "anti-surge provi-
sion" was added. All of these changes were important in overcom-
ing the domestic steel industry's dissatisfaction with the TPM.
1. Extension of the TPM
When the TPM was originally introduced, it was viewed by its
drafters as an emergency measure to tide the United States steel
industry over a brief period of crisis. 185 The new TPM, by con-
trast, will last a minimum of three years, and a maximum of
five. 186 The system is now designed to cover a "transition period"
during which the United States industry is expected to modernize,
and the European Community will "press ahead with restruc-
turing."187
ing the third and fourth quarters. GAO Report, supra note 119, at 3. For the first
quarter of 1980, a 5% increase was announced. Dep't of Treasury News, Nov. 20,
1979. Immediately prior to the filing of complaints by U.S. Steel, Commerce an-
nounced that trigger prices would remain unchanged for the second quarter of 1980.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce News, Mar. 19, 1980.
182. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150 (1980).
183. Id. at 66,833.
184. Id.
185. Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 20.
186. The reinstatement is for a five-year period. Before the end of the third
year, however, the Secretary of Commerce will review the industry's efforts to mod-
ernize. If progress is deemed inadequate in relation to the capability of the industry,
the Secretary may terminate the system. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,835 (1980).
187. The reinstatement of the TPM was premised in part on the domestic in-
dustry's recognition of its "critical need ... to accelerate modernization..." and the
European Community's recognition of the need for "adjustment" by the European
steel industry. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 834 (1980). Apparently, the government antic-
ipates that after five years the domestic industry will be more competitive, and Euro-
pean production capacity will be closer to the level of demand for steel in its home
market. See id.
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2. Strengthening of Administrative Procedures
The administrative changes made in reinstating the TPM place
a greater emphasis on enforcement of the system and give the
United States industry a better opportunity to influence the setting
of the trigger prices. Enforcement is emphasized by the adoption
of suggestions made by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in its
critique of the prior administration of the TPM by the Treasury
Department.' 88 The suggestions adopted include: (1) attempting to
reduce errors made by Customs Service steel import specialists in
comparing import prices and trigger prices; (2) establishing criteria
for follow-up of significant cumulative below-trigger-price ship-
ments; (3) establishing procedures for obtaining replies to requests
for information made to importers; (4) making systematic anti-
dumping reviews of TPM information; (5) preparing written pro-
cedures for antidumping reviews; (6) limiting "preclearance" treat-
ment for below-trigger but above-fair-value imports to specific mill
products and companies which have in fact been precleared; (7) pe-
riodically reviewing preclearance data; (8) responding fully to all
recommendations (by Customs) to initiate antidumping investiga-
tions; (9) exercising care in dealing with such recommendations;
and (10) maintaining complete files on the disposition of TPM
cases. 189 In addition, enforcement of the TPM is assured under the
reinstated system by the Commerce Department's promise to
make regular audits of import transactions, particularly of transac-
tions between related parties, in order to assure that compliance is
not being avoided. 190
188. GAO Report, supra note 119, at 37-38.
189. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,834-35 (1980).
190. Id. at 66,834. Related party transactions are those transactions where the
exporting and importing companies are related, for example, as principal/agent or
parent/subsidiary. The criteria are set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13) (Supp. III 1979).
The governments' concern, of course, is that an import transaction at the trigger price
may be followed by resale below the trigger price. See generally GAO Report, supra
note 119, at 21-22. The Department has recently proposed procedures for monitoring
import transactions between related parties. In such transactions where (1) the for-
eign exporter is not the producer of the steel, resale is made prior to entry in the
United States, and the importer performs processing, distribution or warehousing, or
(2) the foreign exporter is not the producer of the steel and the resale is made after
entry in the United States, Commerce will look beyond the actual import transaction
and will request that the importer report, or arrange for the exporter to report, the ex-
mill price paid to the foreign producer. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,738 (1981). The proposed
procedure, which would examine wholly foreign transactions between foreign ex-
porters and their suppliers, clearly exceeds the authority of the Antidumping Law,
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No longer will trigger prices be determined solely upon data
supplied by Japanese steel producers. Under the new TPM, the
United States industry will be given an opportunity to influence
the level of trigger prices. Commerce will consult, on an individual
basis, with steel producers, steelworkers, and others concerning
the administration of the system. 191 Before establishing quarterly
trigger prices, Commerce will discuss developments in production
costs with steel industry cost experts, 192 review public data to de-
termine whether discrepancies exist between such data and infor-
mation supplied by the Japanese, 193 and make "[a]ppropriate ad-
justments to TPM levels" on the basis of this review. 194
3. The Anti-Surge Provision
The most important modification of the TPM is a substantive
one. The new TPM includes an "anti-surge" provision designed "to
assure that [the] TPM is being administered effectively and to help
identify instances in which dumped or subsidized imports may be
causing injury."'195 The new measure provides that:
Commerce, on request at any time, will consult with the
United States industry concerning surges in apparently dumped
or subsidized imports. Whenever steel mill product imports rise
over 13.7% of apparent domestic consumption, the United States
industry is operating below 87% capability utilization, and there
appears to be a surge in imports of one or more specific products
from one or more specific countries, Commerce will review the
situation. If, as a result of this review, it appears that TPM is be-
ing evaded, appropriate action will be taken. Whenever aggre-
gate imports exceed 15.2% of apparent domestic consumption,
the U.S. industry is operating below 87% capability utilization,
and there appears to be a surge in imports of one or more spe-
cific products from one or more specific countries, Commerce
which is concerned only with sales in the United States at less than fair value. 19
U.S.C. § 1673(1) (Supp. III 1979).
191. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,834 (1980).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. Additional changes in the administration of the system include: (1) op-
portunities for interested parties to request additional product coverage; (2) the es-
tablishment of new preclearance procedures designed to avoid preclearance of
imports which are below fair value by examining home market prices as well as
costs; and (3) the adoption of a three-year rolling average exchange rate system to
avoid exchange rate fluctuations in the trigger prices. Id.
195. Id.
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will examine the situation to ascertain whether the imports are
apparently (1) being dumped on a cost or price basis, (2) the re-
sult of government subsidization, or (3) the result of fair compe-
tition .... If Commerce determines the imports appear to be a
result of unfair competition (dumping or subsidization) and if the
unfair practice does not abate promptly, Commerce will either
initiate dumping/countervailing duty cases . . . or will immedi-
ately make nonconfidential materials and the result of its exami-
nation available and any interested party may then file an
antidumping or countervailing duty petition and Commerce will
not suspend the TPM. In all cases, Commerce will consult with
the domestic industry regarding its review.196
With the addition of the anti-surge provision, far more is ac-
complished than mere assurance of effective TPM administration
and identification of unfair import competition. First, the anti-
surge provision introduces quantitative injury criteria to the
TPM. 197 Second, it provides implicit quantitative controls on steel
imports, allowing a minimum of discretion to Commerce in the en-
forcement of such controls. 198 Third, it enlarges the scope of the
TPM to include the Countervailing Duty Law1 99 as well as the
Antidumping Law. 20 0 Once again, a compromise with several as-
pects and serious implications has been struck. In agreeing to drop
its antidumping complaints against the nation's principal European
trading partners, and foregoing the relief it might have obtained
through legal action, U.S. Steel has obtained major concessions.
196. Id. at 66,834-35.
197. The original TPM was based in part on the assumption that sales at trigger
prices would not injure the domestic industry. See notes 130-37 supra and accompa-
nying text. The new TPM establishes a presumption of injury whenever aggregate
imports (as a percentage of domestic consumption) and domestic capacity utilization
reach predetermined levels and there appears to be a surge of specific imports. If the
Commerce Department then finds the "appearance" of "unfair" pricing or subsidiza-
tion of these imports, it will conclude that a formal investigation is warranted regard-
less of the fact that the imports are being sold at or above the trigger price.
198. In this respect the anti-surge provision is a response to the GAO's criti-
cism of TPM administration by the Treasury Department. Specifically, the GAO
faulted Treasury's lack of explicit injury or market impact criteria for identifying any
significant sales below trigger prices, and blamed Treasury's "ad hoc" tonnage crite-
ria for causing it to ignore potential dumping. GAO Report, supra note 119, at i, 21.
199. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f (Supp. III 1979).
200. Id. §§ 16 7 3 -16 7 7g. The reason for the government's willingness to expand
the TPM to encompass the Countervailing Duty Law is unclear. There has been no
widespread criticism of the Countervailing Duty Law as an ineffective remedy
against subsidized imports. It is possible, however, that the government prefers to
prevent the filing of major countervailing duty complaints while the domestic indus-
try enjoys TPM protection. See notes 225-29 infra and accompanying text.
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First, it has obtained from the government an agreement to
set a low threshold for a presumption of injury under the TPM,
and to set the threshold in strict quantitative terms. 201 Early in the
administration of the original TPM, even while steel prices and
profits were rising dramatically, 20 2 the United States industry con-
tinued to complain of large quantities of imports. 203 With the anti-
surge provision, relief, if only in the form of "procedural protec-
tionism,"204 will be available to the domestic steelmakers whenever
aggregate imports, apparent domestic consumption, and domestic
capacity utilization reach predetermined levels, regardless of the
profitability of the industry and other relevant injury indicia, as
long as subsidized sales, or sales below fair value, or sales evading
trigger price regulation are being made. 20 5 When the prescribed
conditions obtain, therefore, a foreign country exporting to the
United States tonnages of a given steel product amounting to a
"surge" may promptly be excluded from the United States market
by the protectionist effect of a countervailing duty or antidumping
investigation, without regard to the likelihood that material injury
can eventually be demonstrated.
Thus, it may well be that the anti-surge provision establishes,
as the second aspect of the new TPM compromise, an implicit
"quota" system with regard to steel imports. 206 In determining
201. See note 197 supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 152-57 supra.
203. See, e.g., FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 108; Am. Metal Mkt., April 3, 1979, at 4,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, at DI, col. 1.
204. See notes 78-83 supra and accompanying text.
205. Such a limited focus on levels of import penetration and domestic capabil-
ity utilization is not contemplated in the Antidumping Law or its legislative history.
The statute requires the International Trade Commission to consider the following
additional factors in making injury determinations: (1) price undercutting by the im-
porter, measured by comparison with the price of like domestic products; (2) sup-
pression of domestic prices or prevention of domestic price increases; (3) actual and
potential decline in profits, productivity, and return on investments in the domestic
industry; and (4) other relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (Supp. III 1979); see S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 404. See also 19
C.F.R. §§ 207.26-207.27 (1980).
206. Article XI of GATT prohibits the use of such quantitative restrictions by
its signatories. GATT, supra note 36, art. XI. Specific exceptions permit the use of
quotas to correct a balance of payments problem or to protect a nation's internal fi-
nancial position, id. art. XII, to promote health and safety, id, art. XX, to protect na-
tional security, id. art. XXI, and, in suspension of GATT obligations, to limit imports
of individual products on an emergency basis for a limited period of time, id. art.
XIX.
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whether there has been a surge in the volume of imports of a given
product, the Commerce Department "will consider the amount of
increase in those imports, the period in which this increase
occurred, and the significance of the amount in light of prevailing
market conditions and seasonal and recent representative patterns
in trade."2 0 7 The message is clear: since it is unlikely that imports
will frequently be below 13.7% of apparent domestic consump-
tion208 or that capability utilization in the United States will often
rise above 87%209 foreign producers are well-advised not to in-
crease greatly the volume of their shipments of any product to the
United States over that of representative or recent past levels.
Such an increase, unexplained by unusual conditions, will likely
constitute a "surge" and elicit a dumping or countervailing duty in-
vestigation. Although "surge" is not defined in TPM regulations,
there can be little doubt that the anti-surge clause establishes a
ceiling on carbon steel import tonnage based upon past import
volume. In an announcement of a separate program for monitoring
specialty steel imports for surges, 2 10 Commerce defined a "surge"
as "imports . . . ris[ing] above the average levels for the past ten
years .... "211
The third important aspect of the compromise embodied in
the new TPM is perhaps the most significant. Where formerly the
TPM was a system intended to improve upon the United States
antidumping law, the TPM now appears equally to encompass, as
regards steel imports, the Countervailing Duty Law.2 12 This law
207. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,834 n.3 (1980).
208. Imports represented an average of 15.28% of annual apparent United
States steel supply from 1969-1979. In only three years during that decade did this
percentage fall below 13.7%. 1979 Statistical Report, supra note 137, at 8, Table IA.
209. Only once during the past decade did annual domestic steel capacity utili-
zation rise above 87%. Id.
210. The Commerce Department, declining to add specialty steels to the list of
products afforded TPM protection, has decided nonetheless to monitor specialty
steel imports for "surges" of potentially unfair imports. Dep't of Commerce News,
Jan. 8, 1981.
211. Id. The second component of a "surge" in specialty steel imports as de-
fined by Commerce is a clear trend in import levels toward the levels determined by
the Commission in the 1976 Escape Clause Case under § 201 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976). See Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, United
States International Trade Commission Pub. No. 756, Investigation No. TA-201-5.
The TPM surge provision similarly sets import level criteria. See text accompanying
note 196 supra.
212. See note 199 supra.
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imposes a countervailing duty on imported merchandise which has
been subsidized by foreign governments if the importation of the
merchandise results in actual or threatened material injury to a
United States industry.213 Under the anti-surge provision of the
TPM, the Commerce Department promises, whenever imports ex-
ceed 15.2% of apparent domestic consumption, domestic industry
is operating below 87% of capacity, and there appears to be a surge
of a given product, to ascertain whether the imports of that prod-
uct are apparently the result of government subsidization.2 14 If
Commerce concludes that such imports are apparently the result of
subsidization, it will either launch a formal investigation, or will
turn its nonconfidential files over to an interested party, e.g., a do-
mestic producer, so that a countervailing duty complaint may be
privately filed without the loss of TPM protection to the industry.
The new TPM has thus awarded the domestic steel industry
an enhanced countervailing duty protection. First, the government
will initiate a countervailing duty investigation, with a consequent
"procedural protectionist" effect,2 15 based in part on criteria easily
met and mechanically applied. Second, when all the anti-surge re-
quirements are met, the government will use its ability, far greater
than that of a private petitioner, to obtain information regarding
possible subsidization by a foreign government, while at the same
time saving that petitioner the great expense necessary to build a
prima facie case.216
213. 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a) (Supp. III 1979).
214. This process will be completed within 90 days, during which the United
States Trade Representative will discuss the issue with the government concerned.
45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,835 (1980).
215. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text. The protectionist effect of a
countervailing duty investigation will closely resemble that of an antidumping inves-
tigation because both statutes provide for similar procedures and provisional reme-
dies. Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b-1671e (Supp. III 1979) with id. §§ 1673b-1673g.
216. Under the Countervailing Duty Law, a petitioner must allege the ele-
ments necessary for the imposition of a countervailing duty and must submit along
with the petition "information reasonably available to the petitioner" to support the
allegations. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). A petition failing to fulfill these
requirements must be dismissed. Id. § 1671a(c)(3). While the statute restricts admin-
istrative discretion to reject inadequate petitions, it is uncertain to what lengths a pe-
titioner of substantial means, such as U.S. Steel Corporation, must go to build a
prima facie case. When in 1979 U.S. Steel was contemplating filing a countervailing
duty petition against European steel producers, the company sent a team of five at-
torneys and other U.S. Steel employees to conduct a "comprehensive study of the
European steel industry," examining "reams of financial data." Am. Metal Mkt., Apr.
2, 1979, at 5, col. 1. To be sure, information regarding foreign government subsidies
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In return, however, the domestic industry, as in the case of
the TPM as it relates to the Antidumping Law, has sacrificed its
ability to file private countervailing duty complaints except under
the conditions prescribed in the anti-surge provision. Although the
Commerce Department has not announced that it will be unable to
administer both the new TPM and large-scale countervailing duty
complaints,2 17 the inference of this further compromise can be
made from the language of the anti-surge provision. If Commerce
specifically prescribes the conditions under which an interested
party may file a countervailing duty petition without causing the
suspension of the TPM, 21s then the threat is implicit that the filing
of such a petition under other conditions will result in its sus-
pension.
II. LEGALITY OF THE TPM
A. The Davis Walker Case
The validity of the original TPM was challenged in two cases,
Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal219 and Great Lakes Terminal
Ass'n v. Blumenthal,220 in which domestic companies affected by
the TPM sought to enjoin its operation. In both cases the courts
declared that the TPM was within the authority delegated to the
Secretary of the Treasury to administer the Antidumping Act.2 2 1 In
only one of the cases, Davis Walker, did the court address that
precise issue. 222 It is submitted that the Davis Walker court, in
upholding the TPM, failed to base its decision on an analysis of the
mechanism as it has actually operated, and thus incorrectly an-
swered the question whether the TPM accords with the United
States Antidumping Law.
is far more readily available to the United States government than to private parties,
and the inability of private parties to collect information is a potential roadblock to
petitioners' complaints.
217. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
218. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
219. 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978).
220. No. C79-165 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 1979) (order denying preliminary injunc-
tion).
221. 460 F. Supp. at 291; No. C79-165, slip. op. at 14.
222. 460 F. Supp. at 290-91. The Great Lakes court did not reach the issue of
the authority to implement the TPM because the plaintiffs in that case did not ques-
tion that authority in their motion for a preliminary injunction. No. C79-165, slip. op.
at 14, n.8. The action was not pursued to a decision on the merits.
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In Davis Walker, an independent steel wire producer2 2 3 and
its purchasing subsidiary sought injunctive and declaratory relief
with respect to the TPM, alleging, inter alia, that the TPM cir-
cumvents the Antidumping Act by establishing a system of mini-
mum prices which would deter imports at prices below trigger
prices without regard to the fair value of such imports or to the
likelihood of injury to a domestic industry. 224 The plaintiffs argued
that foreign manufacturers would raise their prices to trigger lev-
els, amounting, in effect, to an across-the-board imposition of a
dumping duty without following the statutory procedures.22 5 Be-
cause no steel would be imported below trigger prices, anti-
dumping investigations would never be initiated, and less than fair
value and injury determinations would never be made. 226
On motion from the defendants, the Davis Walker court dis-
solved its preliminary injunction, granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the defendants, and dismissed the action.2 27 In its decision,
the court rejected the argument that the TPM sets minimum
import prices:
The evidence submitted by plaintiffs, particularly the Trea-
sury materials that describe the trigger price system, reveals that
the TPM is merely a device to monitor imports and to provide
the Secretary with sufficient information to enable him to deter-
mine whether to self-initiate an investigation. The TPM itself
does not establish any restrictions upon the affected industry;
rather it serves to aid the Treasury in its administration of the
Antidumping Act. The implementation of the TPM does not by
its terms set trigger prices as minimum import prices or pre-
clude the importation of goods at less than trigger price. 228
223. Davis Walker Corporation is an independent wire drawer and fabricator of
wire products in the sense that it is not related to a steel mill. As such, it must buy
steel wire rod, which is the raw material for its products, on the open market. 460 F.
Supp. at 286 n.1. Most of Davis Walker's competitors are steel mills and mill-related
companies. See USITC Pub. 951, supra note 14, at 13-14. Thus its ability to compete
and to be profitable depends in large part on the margin between the market price of
wire rod, on the one hand, and wire products, on the other. When the first list of
trigger prices was released, independent wire drawers were "squeezed" by the coin-
cidence of a very high trigger price for wire rod and the lack of trigger price cover-
age for wire products. 460 F. Supp. at 296. See also TPM Introductory Note, supra
note 125, at 954.
224. 460 F. Supp. at 289.
225. Id. at 290-91.
226. Id. at 291.
227. Id. at 289.
228. Id. at 292 (emphasis in original).
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The court also rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation of the uni-
form increase of foreign manufacturers' prices to trigger price level
as tantamount to an across-the-board imposition of a dumping duty:
"The decision by foreign manufacturers to increase prices to the
trigger price level is not the legal equivalent of the imposition of
dumping duties . . . .Moreover, the decision of foreign steel ...
manufacturers to increase prices does not allow the Secretary to
avoid the statutory procedures." 229
The only direct effect of the TPM, the court stated, is "a
greater probability that antidumping investigations will be initiated
for imports below trigger prices," since the Secretary would not
necessarily self-initiate an investigation if "the Secretary is satisfied
within the time to be allotted [for informal inquiries of the im-
porters of shipments at prices below applicable trigger prices] that
no reasonable possibility of sales at less than fair value may be
found ... "23 Conversely, the court said, importers' compliance
with the trigger price "will not necessarily foreclose the possibility
of investigation," because private industry complaints might still
trigger an investigation.2 31
Finally, the court noted that since all the statutory procedures
must be followed once an investigation is commenced, the TPM, as
described by the government, does not deny affected parties any
rights they might have under the Antidumping Act.2 32 Having de-
termined that the TPM is merely a guide to aid the Secretary of
the Treasury in determining whether to self-initiate an investiga-
tion,2 33 it only remained for the court to note that authority to ad-
minister such a system is within the Secretary's authority to make
rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of that act.2 3 4
In its analysis of the TPM, the Davis Walker court did not
give adequate consideration to three factors. First, the court failed
to place proper emphasis on the fact that, in the administration of
the TPM, trigger prices were publicized and were not merely used
internally by the administering authority in determining whether
229. Id.
230. Id. The court here virtually quoted the Treasury Department's announce-
ment of TPM regulations. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1468 (1978).
231. 460 F. Supp. at 292.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 293.
234. Id.
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to self-initiate an investigation. 23 5 Second, the court ignored the ef-
fect of statements by Treasury Department officials that the TPM
would operate only in the absence of broad industry-triggered in-
vestigations thus making it clear that investigations would not be
initiated regarding sales at or above the trigger prices.23 6 Third,
the court overlooked the importance of the "procedural protection-
ism" inherent in antidumping investigations. 23 7
B. A Price-Setting System
If the TPM were "merely a device to monitor imports and to
provide [the administering authority] with sufficient information...
to determine whether to self-initiate an investigation, " 23 8 it would
be unnecessary to announce quarterly the trigger prices to apply to
the subsequent calendar quarter.23 9 On the contrary, the periodic
publication of trigger prices is essential to the TPM's more basic
purpose of assuring that prices of steel imports will rise to, or
above, the trigger price level, thus relieving the domestic industry
from aggressive price competition.2 40 The TPM could hardly have
been counted as successful if, rather than diminishing or elim-
inating injury to the United States industry, it had merely given
rise to a multitude of self-initiated antidumping investigations to
replace the industry antidumping petitions whose withdrawal the
Administration had hoped to secure.2 41 Instead, the widest possi-
ble compliance with the system was desired.
Indeed, general compliance with the TPM was to be expected
because the likely penalty for non-compliance was the initiation of
a fast-track antidumping investigation which, within weeks, would
close the United States market to a foreign producer's exports.
Here "procedural protectionism" would play its role. The rewards
for compliance with the system, moreover, were considerable. An
importer who sold at or above the trigger price not only avoided
the danger of an antidumping investigation initiated by the Trea-
sury Department, or later by the Commerce Department, but also
received protection against industry petitions whether or not the
235. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
236. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
237. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
238. 460 F. Supp. at 292.
239. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
240. See notes 134-37 supra and accompanying text.
241. See notes 95-101, 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
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trigger price corresponded to the fair value of his product. This
protection was virtually assured because the administering author-
ity held the threat that the benefits of the TPM would be denied
the domestic industry if industry petitions were too numerous or
too broad. Furthermore, an importer who raised his prices to the
trigger price level would receive a better return on his sales, al-
though his overall United States market share may have declined.
In short, the intent and the expectation of the TPM was that,
in general, foreign steel producers would ensure that their prod-
ucts were imported into the United States at prices no lower than
the trigger price. If "by its terms" the TPM was not a minimum
price system, then by its intended operation it was.
The actual degree of compliance during the operation of the
original TPM is disputed.2 42 Yet, even a report most critical of the
Treasury Department's administration of the TPM provides the ba-
sis for an estimate that for a six month sample period, less than six
percent of imports from all sources represented "unexplained" sales
"significantly" below trigger prices. 243 Perhaps a better measure of
242. Compare TPM Review, supra note 95, at 6-8 with GAO Report, supra
note 119, at i, 16-21.
243. GAO made an initial estimate, based on raw and unconfirmed data from
customs, that from first quarter 1978 to second quarter 1979, below-trigger tonnage
per quarter ranged from 19.04% to 42.88% of imports subject to TPM coverage. GAO
noted, however, that further processing of the data would likely reduce the volume
of below-trigger shipments, as well as the margins (7.22% to 18.04%) by which the
shipments' prices were estimated to undercut trigger prices. For example, uncon-
firmed below-trigger shipments for a sample period from October 1, 1978 to March 1,
1979, totalled 2.4 million tons, or 40% of TPM-covered imports. This unconfirmed
volume was vastly reduced upon further analysis. GAO explained that 224,300 tons
were found to be at, above, or insignificantly below trigger prices. Another 793,000
tons represented shipments small enough or priced close enough to trigger prices to
fall below minimum tonnage-price criteria used by Customs in making antidumping
recommendations to the Customs Trade Analysis Branch (now the Agreements Com-
pliance Division of the Commerce Department). Canadian steel shipments
precleared as sales above fair value even though below trigger prices, see note 251
infra, accounted for 408,300 tons. GAO Report, supra note 119, at 17-18a. Of the re-
maining 957,400 tons, only 133,500 tons could be confirmed as significantly below-
trigger shipments. Id. at 19. GAO estimated that out of the tonnage remaining
unanalysed, the amount which would remain significantly below-trigger was approxi-
mately 222,200 tons. This amount, added to the 133,500 tons confirmed as below-
trigger, brings the total estimate of significantly below-trigger tonnage to 355,700
tons, or 5.9% of the total imports subject to TPM coverage during the sample period.
See id. at 20.
Even this percentage should be put into perspective. On two dates during the
sample period, October 1, 1978, and January 1, 1979, trigger price increases of 4.9%
and 7.0% respectively became effective. Unforeseen delays in shipment of trigger-
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general compliance with the TPM is the effect of the system on the
domestic industry. In the first twelve months of full operation of
the TPM, when trigger prices were rising sharply, 244 steel imports
decreased by 21.2% from the preceeding twelve-month period,
falling to 15.6% of apparent United States consumption,2 45 and do-
mestic steel capacity utilization increased to 88.9%, from 79.7% a
year earlier. 246 Furthermore, the United States steel industry em-
ployment increased by 19,000 workers, 247 and profit-levels of do-
mestic mills showed dramatic improvement. 248 From such results
it may be inferred that the TPM operated as was intended by the
Administration. The Treasury Department made quarterly an-
nouncements of trigger prices, and each quarter the vast majority
of steel imports were sold at prices at, above, or insignificantly be-
low those prices.2 49
It may be argued further that the TPM is a price-setting sys-
tem in more than the "minimum price" sense: the publication of
trigger prices may well have the effect of setting market prices
generally by virtually establishing maximum import prices.250 Con-
priced tonnage from the preceding quarter may therefore have categorized such ship-
ments as significantly below-trigger. Such delays in shipments against firm-priced
contracts accounted for much below-trigger tonnage early in the administration of the
TPM, and led to the initiation of three formal antidumping investigations. See Cer-
tain Carbon Steel Plates from Various Countries, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978); GAO
Report, supra note 119, at 31-35. Although it was practical from the administrative
point of view to set arbitrary quarterly TPM deadlines, it is not easy to explain why a
below-trigger shipment exported on October 1, 1978, should trigger a formal
antidumping investigation, while the same shipment exported a day earlier should
not.
244. See note 150 supra.
245. TPM Review, supra note 95, at 6. The Treasury Department considered
the first full year of operation of the TPM to have begun on May 1, 1978, following
"grace periods" allowing importers and foreign producers to adjust to the system. Id.
at 1, n.2.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Apparently the trigger prices determined the market price with sufficient
certainty to permit one Area Director of Customs to use the trigger price as the
standard for appraisement of steel imports for purposes of ad valorem duty calcula-
tion. Reviewing a protest from an importer of Korean steel who objected to the high
appraisement figure for his entries, the Area Director for the New York Seaport ruled
that "[e]xport value at the trigger price figure is the correct appraisement." Cust. B.
& Dec. 81-11, June 24, 1980.
250. Several of the exporters who were targets of U.S. Steel's antidumping
complaints urged this very point in their reply to the domestic steelmaker's allega-
tions of price suppression by reason of their imports. Certain Carbon Steel Products
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sider the deliberations of a steel purchaser fully informed of the
minimum price at which a steel importer may sell his product
without risk of becoming subject to an antidumping investigation.
That buyer will not, in the absence of a shortage of steel supply,
be willing to pay a price significantly higher than the trigger price.
A foreign steel producer whose costs or marketing policies call for
higher pricing will therefore not be able to charge significantly
more than the trigger price while steel is available at that price.
Moreover, a foreign steel producer who is able to sell his products
at "fair value" prices lower than the trigger price because of his
lower transport costs, advantageous currency exchange, etc., will
not be willing to sell at prices significantly below the trigger price,
because it will not be necessary to price his products so aggres-
sively in order to compete with other producers selling at the trig-
ger price level.251
Perhaps the clearest indication of the function of the TPM as a
price-setting system is the reaction of the United States steel in-
dustry to the evolution of trigger price levels. While trigger prices
rose sharply in the first year of the TPM, domestic prices increased
almost in lock-step.252 When trigger prices remained steady during
the second year of the TPM, the strongest domestic industry criti-
cism of the TPM was heard.2 53
The advent of the new "improved" TPM has not altered the
price-setting character of the system. If it makes any changes in
this area, the new TPM, with its emphasis on enforcement, prob-
ably ensures that trigger prices will be adhered to more scru-
pulously as floor prices for imported steel. In this regard it is
significant to note that the GAO, whose suggestions for better ad-
from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, United States International Trade Com-
mission Preliminary Investigation Numbers 731-TA-18, 731-TA-19, 173-TA-20,
731-TA-21, 731-TA-22, 731-TA-23, 731-TA-24, at 31-32 (April 17, 1980) (statement by
Alfred R. McCauley).
251. Preclearance of below-trigger imports is available to foreign steel produc-
ers who comply with Commerce Department procedures and who can show that
their exports to the United States have a fair value below trigger prices. Such pro-
ducers are allowed to sell below the trigger price without risking the initiation of a
fast-track antidumping investigation. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,500 (1980). Prior to publication
of the new procedures on November, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. (1980), only Canadian ex-
porters had obtained informal preclearance for their products. GAO Report, supra
note 119, at 12-13.
252. See notes 153-57 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 179-81 supra and accompanying text.
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ministration of the system are adopted in the new TPM, appar-
ently regards the TPM as a rigid system which should permit no
imports below trigger prices without action by the administering
authority. 254
C. Incompatability With Existing Trade Law
There is a great difference between monitoring steel imports
to determine whether to self-initiate an antidumping investigation,
and actually setting prices for steel imports. While the former is
undoubtedly within the authority granted by the Antidumping
Law, the latter is not.
The task assigned to the Commerce Department under the
Antidumping Law is a remedial one. First, the Commerce Depart-
ment must determine whether a class or kind of foreign merchan-
dise is being or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than
its fair value. Then, after a determination by the International
Trade Commission that an industry in the U.S. is being materially
injured, or is threatened with material injury, or that its establish-
ment is being materially retarded because of imports of certain
merchandise, the Commerce Department must publish an anti-
dumping duty order with regard to that merchandise so that anti-
dumping duties may be assessed. The Commerce Department is
not authorized to deter the imports of such merchandise without
following the carefully prescribed procedures of the Antidumping
Law.
The successful operation of the TPM avoids the application of
statutory procedures by deterring imports below prescribed prices
unrelated to fair value, a prospective measure not contemplated in
the law.2 55 The TPM, at least insofar as it has actually obliged do-
mestic producers to withdraw their petitions or refrain from filing
petitions, is thus a substitute for Antidumping Law procedures
rather than a regulation authorized for the enforcement of the stat-
ute. If setting the price of imported steel at trigger price levels is
254. In its report, the GAO found fault with the Treasury Department's failure
to initiate formal investigations based on recommendations from Customs, apparently
disagreeing with the Treasury Department's view of the degree of discretion which
should be involved in the decision to initiate an investigation. See GAO Report, su-
pra note 119, at 23-24.
255. The statute itself provides a prospective remedy, of course, but only after
proof of an existing wrong, such as sales at less than fair value plus actual or threat-
ened material injury. See notes 45-69 supra and accompanying text.
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not, as Davis Walker suggests, the "legal equivalent" of imposing
antidumping duties, the TPM is extralegal256 in the sense that
there is not the slightest suggestion in the Antidumping Law that
the administering authority may issue suggested prices to the inter-
national steel community, which, if followed, will avoid an anti-
dumping investigation unless a complaint is filed on behalf of the
domestic industry.
It is axiomatic that the discretion of an administering body
does not extend beyond the authority granted by the empowering
statute:
The power of an administrative officer .. .to administer a fed-
eral statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is
not the power to make law-for no such power can be delegated
by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regula-
tion which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of
harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.2 57
It is submitted that the TPM, a system which actually operates to
avoid the application of statutory procedures and thus works as a
substitute for the Antidumping Law, operates to create a rule out
of harmony with the statute.
If the implementation of the TPM by the Commerce Depart-
ment is ultra vires under the Antidumping Law as a price-setting
system, it is all the more so to the degree that Commerce, through
the new anti-surge provision, will exercise control over the quan-
tities of steel products imported to the United States. Although
the Commerce Department is given broad discretion by the Anti-
dumping Law in determining whether to self-initiate an
antidumping investigation on the basis of "information available to
256. "Extra legal" is the label given to the TPM in a report from the General
Counsel of the International Trade Commission in its report to Commissioner Bedell
on the proposed "Reference Price" antidumping plan, now the TPM. One of the pri-
mary concerns expressed in the report was that the TPM, if successful would be ex-
tralegal in the sense that it would "borrow informally concepts [such as 'constructed
value'] from the [Antidumping] Act, but, in fact, would operate outside, and in avoid-
ance, of [statutory] provisions." ITC Memorandum, supra note 141, at 3.
257. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129,
134 (1936). See also Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U.S. 599 (1930). In Galeno,
the Court stated that "[t]he limits of the power to issue regulations are well settled
.... They may not extend a statute or modify its provisions." Id. at 610 (citations
omitted).
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it,"25 8 and is expressly permitted to determine that "a formal inves-
tigation is warranted into the question of whether the elements
necessary for the imposition of [an antidumping] duty . . . ex-
ist,"259 the Commerce Department is not given discretion to deter-
mine whether the material injury element is present.2 60 A fortiori
the Commerce Department is not empowered to set criteria for a
presumption of injury, such as those established in the anti-surge
provision, any more than it is authorized to prevent injury by set-
ting import quotas. The possibility that the anti-surge provision of
the new TPM may actually establish de facto quotas on steel
imports, of course, may carry the TPM into a new realm of protec-
tion clearly unrelated to its authority under the Antidumping Law.
D. Incompatibility With United States Trade Policy
The impact of the TPM as an actual price-setting system and a
potential limitation on quantities of steel imports must, in a
broader sense, be examined in the context of United States trade
policy. The United States is a nation committed to a policy of free
trade. 261 The preservation of unfettered competition is the funda-
mental goal and policy of United States laws regulating domestic
and international trade.2 62 Indeed, the United States Antidumping
Law, like the Robinson-Patman Act,2 63 has as its purpose the pres-
ervation of fair and dynamic competition between sellers.2 64 Like
258. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (Supp. III 1979).
259. Id.
260. Injury determinations are the responsibility of the International Trade
Commission. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
261. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
262. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open
to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Id.
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-13b, 21a (1976).
264. Baier, supra note 29, at 428-30. The most striking difference between the
two laws is in the standards set for unlawful price discrimination. Under the
Robinson-Patman Act price variations are unlawful only "where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
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the Robinson-Patman Act, the Antidumping Law, in restraining
price discrimination, has the potential for serious anticompetitive
effects. 265 The legislative history of the Antidumping Law and of its
predecessor, the Antidumping Act of 1921, reflect the concern of
Congress that protection against unfair import pricing should not
result in static price competition. 266 It is essential, therefore, that
the administration of the Antidumping Law be carried out in a
manner which will preserve a healthy free trade environment.
The Task Force received early assurances from the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department that the concept of the TPM
did not violate the antitrust laws. 26 7 Nevertheless, the Antitrust
Division orally advised the Task Force that certain steps should be
taken in formulating the plan to minimize the risk of antitrust vio-
lation:
We advised that it was necessary to avoid any actual or implied
agreement between steel producers, domestic or foreign, by as-
suring that the Task Force was acting unilaterally and indepen-
dently of the producers. . . .We advised that under those cir-
cumstances the Department ... would not challenge the plan as
such. We cautioned, of course, that the plan could be the sub-
ject of an antitrust suit by a private party, and that the outcome
of such an attack was not entirely certain.268
The potential of the TPM to restrain competition was the sub-
ject of stronger reservations within the International Trade Com-
mission:
It is apparent that the . . . plan would take statutory concepts
such as . . . "cost of production" and apply them to a non-
statutory procedure, which essentially fixes minimum prices on
imports. . . . [I]t is possible that importers of merchandise sub-
ject to a "reference price" plan [TPM] may be sued by a cus-
tomer for price fixing, a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act . ... 269
oly in any line of commerce . 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); see text accompanying
note 44 supra.
265. See Baier, supra note 29, at 428-29; Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 44-45.
266. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7316; H.R. REP. No. 79, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1921).
267. Letter from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Di-
vision of the Justice Department, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Jan. 9, 1978) (copy
on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
268. Id.
269. ITC Memorandum, supra note 141, at 19-20.
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The Task Force was careful, therefore, in establishing the
TPM to avoid any appearance that the Treasury Department would
influence the industry's price decisions directly or would encourage
collusive pricing on the part of foreign producers.270 There is no
hard evidence that actual concerted pricing resulted from the im-
plementation of the TPM. In view of its actual effects in estab-
lishing market price levels,27 1 however, it is clear that the TPM is
inconsistent with Sherman Act principles.
One commentator, in a recent and perceptive article exploring
the possible conflicts of the original TPM with the Sherman Act
and antitrust policies, 27 2 has argued that, to the extent the TPM at-
tempts to control competition from imported steel mill products, it
is "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations" within the meaning of section I of the
Sherman Act. 2 73 The author, noting that the Sherman Act's section
I proscription is limited to contracts, combinations, or conspira-
cies, 274 raised the question whether an agreement between the do-
mestic steel industry and the government giving rise to the TPM
constitutes a contract under section 1.275 She argued that, insofar
as such a contract tampers with price structure, it may be a per se
Sherman Act violation despite the Noerr-Pennington doctrine2 76
and despite the fact that the Executive Branch was involved.2 77
270. See, e.g., Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 8, 17-18.
271. See notes 237-54 supra and accompanying text.
272. Nolan-Haley, The Trigger Price Mechanism: Protecting Competition or
Competitors? 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1980).
273. Id. at 12.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 12-13. The commentator considers many other possible combina-
tions, such as between the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
acting on behalf of Japanese steel producers, and the Treasury Department. Id.
276. Id. at 14. Price fixing resulting from solicitation of administrative or legis-
lative action by private parties is exempt from antitrust liability. United Mine Work-
ers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Nevertheless, abuses of administrative or judicial
processes which effectively bar respondents from access to government agencies and
the courts "cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'politi-
cal expression.' " California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
513 (1972).
277. Nolan-Haley, supra note 272, at 15. There is some authority for the propo-
sition that the Executive Branch cannot, by its participation in an agreement other-
wise in violation of the Sherman Act, give binding assurances that such agreement
does not violate the Sherman Act. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F.
Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd as modified sub nom. Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975). In Consumers Union, a consumers organization challenged the authority of
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The nature of the compromises and cooperation necessary
among the government, the United States steel industry, and for-
eign steel producers and their representatives may well constitute
a contract or conspiracy under the Sherman Act. Indeed, the basic
assumption underlying the TPM, that the domestic industry would
not be injured by trigger-priced imports and so would not have to
resort to antidumping complaints, and that foreign producers
would voluntarily maintain their prices at trigger levels, suggest
the encouragement of such indirect cooperation between foreign
and domestic steel producers. Under the new TPM, the co-
operation will be extended for five years. Furthermore, by giving
the domestic industry a greater opportunity to influence the set-
ting of trigger prices, and by prescribing consultations between
the Commerce Department and industry representatives in addi-
tion to those between Commerce and Japanese industry officials,
the new TPM provides an atmosphere which fosters greater bilat-
eral activity.
The new anti-surge provision under the reinstated TPM com-
pounds the anti-competitive thrust of TPM price controls. Con-
the President to reduce steel imports through the negotiation of Voluntary Restraint
Agreements signed in 1969 and 1971 by representatives of the Japanese and Euro-
pean steel industries. Despite the consumer group's stipulation of dismissal of its
claim that the voluntary restraint agreement violated the Sherman Act, the district
court declared:
[Wihen representatives of the Executive Branch venture into areas where the
antitrust laws have apparent application, they must proceed with strict regard
for legislation outlawing restraints of trade so that no action taken will be in-
consistent with the clear requirements of settled national policy....
The Court declares that the Executive has no authority under the Con-
stitution or acts of Congress to exempt the Voluntary Restraint Agreements
on Steel from the antitrust laws and that such arrangements are not exempt.
Id. On appeal, the declaration of the district court was held to be "without judicial
force or effect and . . . not appropriate for pursuit upon appeal." 506 F.2d at 141.
Nonetheless, the General Counsel of the International Trade Commission relied on
the district court's language to support his conclusion that the authority to implement
the TPM is uncertain. ITC Memorandum, supra note 141, at 20-21. Participants in
the Voluntary Restraint Agreements on Steel were given retroactive, but not prospec-
tive, immunity under the antitrust laws by Congress in § 607 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (1976), at the request of the United States Department of
State. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 232, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7360-61. For a discussion of the Consumers Union case,
see Comment, Executive Authority and Antitrust Considerations in "Voluntary"
Limits on Steel Imports, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 105 (1969). For a discussion of the
events leading to the execution of the Voluntary Restraint Agreements and their
aftermath, see W. HOGAN, THE 1970's: CRITICAL YEARS FOR STEEL 54-71 (1972).
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certed pricing is not the only restraint of trade forbidden by sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act; agreements restricting quantities of
goods to be sold may also constitute per se violations z.27  Competi-
tion in the marketplace is as much affected by restricting the quan-
tity of goods available as by dictating the prices at which they may
be sold.2 79 Thus the ceiling placed on carbon steel import tonnage
by the anti-surge provision may also be, or may encourage, an anti-
trust violation. At the very least, the provision protects the domes-
tic industry in a way neither consistent with antitrust policy nor
contemplated in the Antidumping Law.
The protectionist and anti-competitive thrust of the new TPM
clearly exceeds that of the Antidumping Law. The Antidumping
Law, of course, necessarily limits price competition by ultimately
imposing a special duty on dumped imports. It does so, however,
only after separate determinations are made by independent quasi-
judicial bodies, and only after strictly 'prescribed procedures are
followed. 280 Its tendencies toward procedural protectionism and
substantive protectionism are tempered by its procedural and ap-
pellate safeguards, and are balanced by the difficulty involved in
the preparation of a prima facie antidumping case by a private
party. 281 In contrast, the TPM uses the inherent protectionist
tendencies of the Antidumping Law and the imminent threat of a
fast-track investigation to enforce minimum prices, and, it appears,
maximum tonnages, set without regard to the actual fair value of
the imports involved or their potential for injury.
The TPM thus prevents injury to the domestic industry while
permitting foreign producers access to the United States market,
but at prices and in quantities controlled by an administrative body
not authorized by law to do so. In short, the preservation of lim-
ited import competition is negated by the destruction of the free
market in steel trade.
278. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). Such
agreements constitute per se violations because they interfere with the "free play of
market forces." Id. Moreover, express agreement on the part of competitors is not re-
quired. Mere acceptance by competitors of an invitation to participate in a plan the
necessary consequence of which is restraint of trade is sufficient to establish a con-
spiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
279. 310 U.S. at 221.
280. See notes 46-73 supra and accompanying text.
281. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
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E. Impact of the Reinstated TPM
Finally, it should be noted that the TPM, as it has actually op-
erated and as it will likely operate in its new form, is not even con-
sistent with the overall objectives announced by its drafters.2 2 Far
from "maintaining an open world trading environment based upon
normal trading practices," the system has substituted price controls
and eliminated normal market competition from foreign sources.
The TPM is not "responsive to the requirements of suppliers and
consumers alike," but obliges the consumer to bear the brunt of its
inflationary effects. Rather than avoiding any "direct government
involvement in the industry's decisions" and helping "create an en-
vironment in which a free industry can operate efficiently," the
level of the quarterly trigger price dictates the price increase a do-
mestic producer may announce, and may well increase the indus-
try's dependency on government programs. 283
As a temporary measure viewed in the context of emergency
conditions, the TPM may be a successful means of preventing in-
jury to an endangered industry while keeping the United States
market open to imports. Such a system can only create more prob-
lems than it solves, however, if it remains in effect for long.
The manufacture of steel products plays a major role in the
United States economy. 284 The steel industry itself is a large em-
ployer, but the metalworking sector in the United States, com-
prised of the steel-consuming industries directly linked to steel
supply, accounts for twenty times more employment. 28 5 Although a
strong domestic steel industry is important to the nation, steel
users will pay the price of protectionism by losing their ability to
282. See Solomon Report, supra note 1, at 7-8.
283. Some domestic industry officials fear that dependence will result from
control of the steel market by the government. " '[T]he trigger price mechanism can
seriously distort the steel marketplace by having pricing decisions made by civil ser-
vants . . . . [T]he mechanism has numerous inconsistencies and inequities that can
provide potential opportunity to dole out penalties or favors to certain products, man-
ufacturers, importers, or geographical areas.' " Am. Metal Mkt., Dec. 2, 1980, at 4,
col. 3 (statement attributed to F. Kenneth Iverson, president of Nucor Corporation, a
domestic steel producer).
284. See 1975 COWPS Report, supra note 22, at 5; Solomon Report, supra note
1, at 3.
285. Mueller, The Competitiveness of the U.S. Steel Indusry After the New
Trigger Price Mechanism, 10 (December, 1980) (Monograph Series: No. 25, Business
and Economic Research Center, Middle Tennessee State University) [hereinafter
cited as Mueller Monograph].
[Vol. 4:289
TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM
compete, both at home and abroad, with foreign metalworking
companies. 286
There is reason to doubt, moreover, that the latest round of
protection for the steel industry will result in significant moderni-
zation efforts on the part of steelmakers. Results of recent protec-
tionist efforts suggest that the opposite will be true. The Voluntary
Restraint Agreements of 1969 and 1971287 were intended to give a
respite to the industry by temporarily restricting imports. 2 8 In-
stead of using this time to modernize their plants, several inte-
grated steel producers cut back their steel investments and
intensified their diversification efforts. 2 9 In fact, U.S. Steel Corpo-
ration, now promised three to five years of protection from import
competition under the reinstated TPM, has declared its intention
to invest half of its capital in the 1980's in such non-steel areas as
chemicals, transportation, and utilities,2 90 as well as strictly finan-
cial interests in coal reserves. 291
Government officials argue that the new TPM is compatible
with free trade, 292 or, at least, preferable to the alternatives to the
program. 293 The fact is, however, that free import price competi-
tion is essential to preserve the interests of domestic steel consum-
ers and to protect the economy as a whole from the inflationary ef-
fects of unrestrained domestic steel pricing.294 The conduct of
286. Id. at 10-11. See United States International Trade Commission, Prelimi-
nary Investigation Nos. 731-TA-18 - 24. Certain Carbon Steel Products from
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, at 6 (April 23, 1980) (statement of the United
States Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Statement].
287. See note 277 supra.
288. See Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement of the President,
May 6, 1972, reprinted in W. HOGAN, supra note 277, at 70-71 (1972); Mueller Mon-
ograph supra note 285, at 13.
289. Mueller Monograph, supra note 285, at 13. The Commerce Department's
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Import Administration, John Greenwald, has
noted that industries which have been given protection in the past have not used the
protection as an opportunity to modernize, but rather have used the protection as an
excuse not to modernize. Am. Metal Mkt., Apr. 10, 1980.
290. IRON AGE, Jan. 5, 1981, at MP-19.
291. Id. " 'Our purpose in being in the coal business is to make money, not to
hold on to reserves.' " Id. (statement attributed to David Roderick, Chairman of U.S.
Steel Corporation).
292. See, e.g., TPM Review, supra note 95, at 8; Am. Metal Mkt., Feb. 24,
1981, at 5, col. 1.
293. Am. Metal Mkt., Oct. 14, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
294. See 1975 COWPS Report, supra note 22, at i; Justice Department State-
ment, supra note 286, at 8-11.
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United States steel companies has been characterized by oligopoly
and administered prices that have been inflexible downward, even
in recessionary periods. 295 By insulating those companies from
import price competition, the TPM can only temporarily support
an inefficient industry at the expense of the economy as a whole.
The stability of the nation's economy, the competitiveness in
international markets of United States steel-consuming industries,
and even the efficiency of the domestic steel industry it seeks to
protect, have been endangered by the reinstatement of the TPM.
No emergency price-setting measure can be as salutary for the
economy in the long term, nor as sure a guardian of progress and
efficiency, as an open market in which competition is given free
rein. In a message to Congress encouraging adoption of the Trade
Expansion Act, President Kennedy urged:
Once given a fair and equal opportunity to compete in oversea
markets, and once subject to healthy competition from oversea
manufacturers for our own markets, American management and
labor will have additional reason to maintain competitive costs
and prices, modernize their plants, and increase their productiv-
ity. The discipline of the world marketplace is an excellent mea-
sure of efficiency and a force to stability. To try to shield Ameri-
can industry from the discipline of foreign competition would
isolate our domestic price level from world prices, encourage do-
mestic inflation, reduce our exports still further, and invite less
desirable governmental solutions. 296
It will be ironic if the new Reagan Administration, dedicated
to laissez-faire economics and opposed to industrial subsidies and
295. Justice Department Statement, supra note 286, at 6; COUNCIL ON WAGE
AND PRICE STABILITY, PRICES AND COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY
20 (1977).
In addition to their secular rise over the past decade, steel prices have also
been the least flexible of industrial prices. The rate of increase in steel
prices often slows during recessionary periods, but rarely falls below zero
... . [T]he average price of steel has not declined when demand has
fallen-a pattern different from that of other metals .... As world prices fell
in [1969-70 and 1974-75], the U.S. domestic prices remained comparatively
stable. This opened a large gap between U.S. and imported steel prices
which inevitably caused imports to increase. It is no coincidence that
imports rose sharply in 1971 and 1976-77 ....
Id. Throughout the 1970's price indices for steel mill products, expressed as a per-
centage of 1970 price indices, were higher than the average for all industrial com-
modities. White House Conference, supra note 158, Figure A.
296. 108 CONG. REC. 952-53 (1962) (message to Congress, Jan. 25, 1962).
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government intervention, masks government intervention and a
non-budget subsidy for the steel industry behind restrictive pricing
and import restraints by perpetuating the TPM.
CONCLUSION
The steel Trigger Price Mechanism was proposed in 1977 as
an emergency import price monitoring system to assist the govern-
ment in the enforcement of the Antidumping Act of 1921 while
preserving free trade. Its actual operation under that act and its
function as reinstated under the new antidumping provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, however, is inconsistent with
United States trade law, with traditional United States trade pol-
icy, and with the declared objectives of the TPM. The reinstated
TPM is not an emergency measure, but a fixture on the trade land-
scape for as many as five more years; not a mere monitoring sys-
tem, but a price-setting mechanism; not a means of preserving free
trade, but a protectionist barrier to vital import competition; not a
mechanism for enforcing the Antidumping Law, but a compromise
measure avoiding and obviating the application of the law, and
reaching to encompass the Countervailing Duty Law as well.
The reinstated TPM threatens steel consumers and the
economy as a whole by limiting steel import volume and by under-
writing inflationary price increases. It distorts traditional trade pat-
terns and disrupts normal trade relations with' other nations. It in-
sulates an inefficient domestic industry from the stimulus of
healthy competition, and encourages bilateral activity which may
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. This system is not
the answer to the problems of the steel industry. An early end to
the Trigger Price Mechanism should be declared, in the interests
of free trade, the economy, and the rule of law.
Garry P. McCormack
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